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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
STEPHEN JASSO, 
& 
CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
CAMAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
the state ofIdaho, 
Respondent. 
State ofIdaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Camas ) 
Consolidated Case Nos.: CV 2009-14 & CV 
2009-15 
AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN 
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
TO AUGMENT RECORD 
Dwight Budin, being first duly sworn, sayeth as follows: 
AFFIDA VIT OF DWIGHT BUT LIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD - 1 
1. My name is Dwight Butlin. I am over the age of 18 years, and I am of sound 
mind. The statements I make in this affidavit are made upon my own personal knowledge and 
are true to the best of my knowledge. 
2. I am the Planning and Zoning Administrator for Camas County. As such, I 
maintain a record of: (a) all land use ordinances for Camas County, including the Camas County 
Subdivision Ordinance; and (b) all international codes adopted by Camas County, including the 
International Fire Code. 
3. At the time the Fricke Creek Application was filed, in June 2008, Camas County 
had duly adopted the 2006 edition of the International Fire Code. Camas County uses the 
International Fire Code, including its appendixes, in its review of subdivision applications. 
Though the provisions in the appendixes are not mandatory, the County regularly utilizes and 
relies on the provisions in the appendixes when considering subdivision applications. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is Appendix D to the 2006 International Fire Code. 
This is a true and correct copy of the entire Appendix D existing at the time of the Fricke Creek 
Application in June 2008. 
5. Camas County regularly utilizes the guidelines in Appendix D in its review of 
subdivision applications, including the Fricke Creek Application. 
Further this affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this 1 st day of July, 2009. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD - 2 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this _'_' __ day of July, 2009. 
/~ot~ublic for idah~, 
/ ResIdmg at: £.1 tp / d 
My cornmissio-'-n """ex..u.~q-Ir<-<es.-L-: -----;-[ -, -I-'i-~ -02-c-/-, 
AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD - 3 
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EXHIBIT A 
APPENDIX D 
FIRE APPARATUS ACCESS ROADS 
The provisions contained in this appendix are not mandatory unless specifically referenced in the adopting ordinance. 
SECTION 0101 
GENERAL 
DIOl.l Scope. Fire apparat~s access roads shall be in accor-
dance with this appendix and all other applicable requirements 
of the International Fire Code. 
SECTION 0102 
REQUIRED ACCESS 
DI02.1 Access and loading. Facilities, buildings or portions 
of buildings hereafter constructed shall be accessible to fIre 
department apparatus by way of an approved fire apparatus 
access road with an asphalt, concrete or other approved driving 
surface capable of supporting the imposed load of fIre appara-
tus weighing at least 75,000 pounds (34 050 kg). 
SECTION 0103 
MINIMUM SPECIFICATIONS 
DI03.1 Access road width with a hydrant. Where a fire 
hydrant is located on a fire apparatus access road, the minimum 
road width shall be 26 feet (7925 mm). See Figure D103.1. 
DI03.2 Grade. Fire apparatus access roads shall not exceed 10 
percent in grade. 
Exception: Grades steeper than 10 percent as approved by 
the fire chief. 
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DI03.3 Turning radius. The minimum turning radius shall be 
determined by the fire code official. 
DI03.4 Dead ends. Dead-end fire apparatus access roads in 
excess of 150 feel (45720 mm) shall be provided with width 
and turnaround provisions in accordance with Table DI03.4. 
TABLE 0103.4 
REQUIREMENTS FOR DEAD-END FIRE 
APPARATUS ACCESS ROADS 
'-~LE~N-G~T-H-''-'-W-ID-TH---'I--- ~J 
(feet) (feet) TURNAROUNDS REQUIRED 
r----.--~------~------
0-150 20 None required I 
151-500 20 
120-foot Hammerhead, 6O-fool "Y" orl 
%-fool-diarneler cul-de-sac in I 
accordance with Figure 0103.1 I 
~------~-------T--------------~------~--~ 
! 
120-fool Hammerhead, 6O-fool "Y" or i 
50I-75~Oi_= 26 ! 96-fool-diameler cul-de-sac in i 
accordance with Figure 0103.1 I 
Ov~r:. ;50~~cia~proval required __ ~ 
For SI: 1 foot = 304.8 mm. 
D103.5 Fire apparatus access road gates. Gates securing the 
fire apparatus access roads shall comply with all of the follow-
ing criteria: 











TO 120' HAMMERHEAD 
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I 
APPENDIX 0 
2. Gates shall be of the swinging or sliding type . 
3. Construction of gates shall be of materials that allow 
manual operation by one person. 
4. Gate components shall be maintained in an operative 
condition at all times and replaced or repaired when 
defective. 
5. Electric gates shall be equipped with a means of opening 
the gate by fire department personnel for emergency 
access. Emergency opening devices shall be approved 
by the fire code official. 
6. Manual opening gates shall not be locked with a padlock 
or chain and padlock unless they are capable of being 
opened by means of forcible entry tools or when a key 
box containing the keyes) to the lock is installed at the 
gate location. 
7. Locking device specifications shall be submitted for 
approval by the fire code official. 
DI03.6 Signs. Where required by thf! fire code official, fire 
apparatus access roads shall be marted with permanent NO 
PARKING-FIRE LANE signs c mplying with Figure 
DI03.6. Signs shall have a minimum imension of 12 inches 
(305 mm) wide by 18 inches (457 rum) high and have red let-
ters on a white reflective background. Signs shall be posted on 
one or both sides of the fue apparatus road as required by Sec-
tion D103 .6.1 or D103.6.2. 
SIGN TYPE "A" 
NO 
PARKING 
FIRE LANE ... 
~. 12"-1 
SIGN TYPE "C" 
NO 
PARKING 
FIRE LANE ... 
~ 12" -~ 
FIGURE 0103.6 
FIRE LANE SIGNS 








DI03.6.1 Roads 20 to 26 feet in width. Fire apparatus 
access roads 20 to 26 feet wide (6096 to 7925 nun) shall be 
posted on both sides as a fue lane. 
D103.6.2 Roads more than 26 feet in width. Fire appara-
tus access roads more than 26 feet wide (7925 mm) to 32 
feet wide (9754 mrn) shall be posted on one side of the road 
as a fue lane. 
SECTION 0104 
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
DI04.2 Buildings exceeding 62,000 square feet in area. 
Buildings or facilities having a gross building area of more than 
62,000 square feet (5760 m2) shall be provided with two sepa-
rate and approved fire apparatus access roads. 
Exception: Projects having a gross building area of up to 
124,000 square feet (II 520 m2) that have a single approved 
fue apparatus access road when all buildings are equipped 
throughout with approved automatic sprinkler systems. 
DI04.3 Remoteness. Where two access roads are required, 
they shall be placed a distance apart equal to not less than one 
half of the length of the maximum overall diagonal dimension 
of the property or area to be served, measured in a straight line 
between accesses. 
SECTION 0105 
AERIAL FIRE APPARATUS ACCESS ROADS 
DI0S.1 Where required. Buildings or portions of buildings or 
facilities exceeding 30 feet (9144 rum) in height above the low-
est level of fire department vehicle access shall be provided 
with approved fire apparatus access roads capable of accom-
modating fire department aerial apparatus. Overhead utility 
and power lines shall not be located within the aerial fire appa-
ratus access roadway. 
DI0S.2 Width. Fire apparatus access roads shall have a mini-
mum unobstructed width of 26 feet (7925 mm) in the immedi-
ate vicinity of any building or portion of building more than 30 
feet (9144 mm) in height. 
DI0S.3 Proximity to building. At least one of the required 
access routes meeting this condition shall be located within a 
minimum of 15 feet (4572 mm) and a maximum of 30 feet 
(9144 mm) from the building, and shall be positioned parallel 
to one entire side of the building. 
SECTION 0106 
MULTIPLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
DI06.1 Projects having more than 100 dwelling units. Mul-
tiple-family residential projects having more than 100 dwell-
ing units shall be equipped throughout with two separate and 
approved fue apparatus access roads. 
Exception: Projects having up to 200 dwelling units may 
have a single approved fue apparatus access road when all 
buildings, including nonresidential occupancies, are 
equipped throughout with approved automatic sprinkler 
systems installed in accordance with Section 903.3.1.1 or 
903 .3. 1.2. 
DI06.2 Projects having more than 200 dwelling units. Mul-
DI04.1 Buildings exceeding three stories or 30 feet in tiple-family residential projects having more than 200 dwcll -
height. Buildings or facilities exceeding 30 feet (9144 mm) or ing units shall be provided with two separate and approved fire 
three stories in height shaH have at least three means of fire apparatus access roads regardless of whether they are equipped 
apparatus access for each structure. with an approved automatic sprinkler system. 
Af~~&Q.v. ~; 0", b\.A...)'.l1c\-:t BJ\~f' In CS L.o....-\"::;,~:)~T* of· R~sp or\-~~'S f)lC-t~QYT\ 
398 -r (\ ...\.SoL.") .lI , d 2dy6 INTERNATIONAL FIRE COD~ 
J 0 H dtyl-Q../n.. \ I}{LQ Cn - (Jl r -, . -----_. 
SECTION 0107 
ONE- OR TWO-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
DI07.1 One- or two-family dwelling residential develop-
ments. Developments of one- or two-family dwellings where 
the number of dwelling units exceeds 30 shall be provided with 
separate and approved fIre apparatus access roads and shall 
meelilie requirements of Section DI04.3. 
~ 
Exceptions: 
1. Where there are more than 30 dwelling units on a sin-
gle public or private fIre apparatus access road and all 
dwelling units are equipped throughout with an 
approved automatic sprinkJer system in accordance 
with Section 903 .3.1.1, 903.3.1.2 or 903.3 .1.3.3, 
access from two directions shall not be required. 
2. The number of dwelling units on a single fIre appara-
tus access road shall not be increased unless fIre appa-
ratus access roads will connect with future 
development, as determined by the fIre code official. 
f.\ ~ f ~ 6.CLu ~ \ C) -\ Uw'. 0""-\ 
~ 0 ~~ ryl "- t,,-t K Q_ ~J:~' Y ~~ 
2Q061NTERNATIONAL FIRE COD~ 
APPENDIX D 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 st day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
James W. Phillips 
Roark Law Firm, LLP 
409 North Main Street 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Benjamin W. Worst 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.e. 
P.O. Box 6962 







AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD - 4 
dO) 
JAMES W. PHILLIPS 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
Attorneys at Law 
409 N. Main St. 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
208/788-2427 
ISB # 1520 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IbF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 




CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the 


















CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, 
husband and wife, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the 

















Case NoS. CV-2009-l4 
and CV-2009-15 r 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSI~ION TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTIbN TO 
AUGMENT RECORD 
COMES NOW, Stephen V. Jasso, the above-named petltione~, 
by and through James W. Phillips of The Roark Law Fi 1m, hls 
attorneys of record, and files this memorandum in oppositiot to the 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S 
HOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - 1 
I 
J '.' L I " :... U:} / j '. C 't . J ~ [!¥l lnc UW\' r l1\lVI :. UUj 
Respondent's Motion to Augment The Record filed on July 1,12009. 
The Petitioner objects to the motion on the following grou~dS: 
1. Appendix D of the International Fire Code (If I~C") was 
not part of the Agency Record prepared and filed by theiAgency 
under IRCP Rule 84; there is no reason given for the assert~on now 
that it should be part of the record or why it was not incl~ded by 
the County in its record of the proceedings; and, it liS not 
properly admissible based on the Affidavit Of Dwight But-lin In 
I 
Support Of Respondent's Motion To Augment Record. 
2. Proof of adoption of the IFC by Camas County can only 
be accomplished by filing of a certified copy of the ordinance 
adopting same, which in this case is stated to be Zoning or~kinan~e 
152. Similarly, proof of consideration of the IFC by Camas County 
with regard to the Fricke Creek subdivision application ca not be 
established by the mere assertion thereof in the Affidavit of 
Dwight Butlin, which affidavit is not part of the reJord of 
proceedings with regard to the Decision under judicial re~iew. 
DATED thiS.~~ day of July, 2009. ~ I 
THE ROARK AW FIRM, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - 2 
LMVV r 1 n.lvi r fit. n I), L U 0 I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the ~ day of July, 2009, I 
foregoing document to the following: 
Jill S. Holinka 
Paul Fitzer 
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucker Chtd 
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 520 
Boise, 1D 83702 
Via Fax: 208-331-1202 
attorney for Camas County, Idaho 
Ben Worst 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum 1D 83340 
Via Fax: 208-622-2755 
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe 
Dated: 7 -{fJ7:E!:1. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S 




Benjamin W. Worst, ISB#5639 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.c. 
371-A Walnut Avenue North 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 622-6699 
Facsimile: (208) 726-8116 
benworst@cox.net 
Attorney for Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
* * * * * 






CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political ) 





CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, husband ) 






CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political ) 




Case No. CV 2009-14 
Case No. CV-2009-15 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION 
TO AUGMENT RECORD 
IRCP 84(1) 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO AUGMENT - 1 
;;)00 
COME NOW Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe, husband and wife ("Gorringes"), by 
and through Benjamin W. Worst of the law firm Benjamin W. Worst, P.c., their attorney of 
record, and submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Camas County's Motion to Augment 
objecting to such augmentation for the following reasons: 
1. Camas County has provided no proof that such Fire Code and Appendix were ever duly 
adopted by the County. The Butlin Affidavit provides nothing more than Mr. Butlin's 
assurance t.hat such Code was duly adopted while the Motion to Augment indicates that such 
code was adopted by Camas County in its Zoning Ordinance. 
2. Camas County provides no explanation why it failed to include this document as part of 
the agency record in this action even though Camas County is the agency legally obligated to 
prepare the entire record in a timely manner. 
Nonetheless, Gorringes hereby consent to augmentation of the record with the addition of 
the applicable Zoning Ordinance; however, Camas County must still demonstrate that such Code 
and Appendix are an integral part of such Zoning Ordinance. 
ck.. 
DATED this II day of (J=:~ (1 ,2009. 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.c. 
Attorney At Law 
enjamin W. Worst, 
Attorney for Petitioners Gorringe 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO AUGMENT· 2 
;)olp 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I HEREB Y CERTIFY that on this fl day of if:;:~ , 2009, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN 0 OSITION TO CAMAS 
COUNTY'S MOTION TO AUGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Mr. Paul Fitzer, Esq. 
Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turke 
950 West Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Mr. Patrick Dunn 
35211 Palmeter Lane SE 
Snoqualmie, Washington 98065 
James W. Phillips 
The Roark Law Firm 
409 N. Main St. 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~ Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
(~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile: ( ) ____ _ 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
0/J Facsimile: (208) 788-3918 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.e. 
Attorney At Law 
By: ' 
/ Benjamin W. Worst 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO AUGMENT· 3 
~o1 
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Paul 1. Fitzer ISB #5675 
Jill S. Holinka ISB #6563 
11V. IV.I I I, L 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TL'RCKE, CHARTERED 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bru.mock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
ISB Nos.: 5675,6563 
Email: pjf@msbtltrW.com 
jsh@msbtlaw.com 
Attorneys for Respondents 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
STEPHEN JASSO, 
& 
CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
CAMAS COUNTY~ a political subdivision of 
the state of Idaho, 
Respondent. 
Consolidated Case Nos.: CV 2009-14 & CV 
2009-15 
RESPONSE 
COMES NOW the Respondent" Camas County ("County"), by and through its 
undersigned counsel of record, the law timl of Moore Smith Buxton & TUfcke, Chtd., and 
hereby submits its Response. 
BRIEF - 1 
.' v ~. L Ii. L I) \i '1 L . ;;) r IVI 
11V. "tV] \ i. J 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes before the Court on the consolidated Petitions for Judicial Review of 
Petitioners Stephen Jasso ("Jasso") and Curtis and Carnie Gon-inge l ("Gon-inge"). The subject 
of the Petitions is Camas County's approval of an application for subdivision and preliminary 
plat-the so-called "Fricke Creek Subdivision"- filed by Patrick Dunn. Petitioners allege 
numerous procedural and legal errors in the County's approval of the Subdivision and therefore 
request that the approval be set aside. Petitioners further allege that the County acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law in approving the subdivision, entitling them to attorney fees and 
costs under Idaho Code § 12-117, The County submits that its review and approval of the 
Subdivision was reasonable and does not entitle Petitioners to the relief requested. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIE\V 
The Idall0 Administrative Procedures Act (IDAP A) governs the review of local land use 
decisions.2 The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of 
the evidence on questions of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.3 Camas County (acting 
through the Planning and Zoning Board and the Board of Adjustment) is treated as an 
administrative agency for purpose of judicial review.4 As to the weight of the evidence on 
questions of fact, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning agency, The 
Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous; and the agency's 
factual detelminations are binding on the reviewing court, even when there is conflicting 
evidence before the agency, so long as the detenninations are supported by evidence in the 
1 Jasso and Goninge are sometimes collectively referred to herein as "Petitioners." 
2 Price v. Payette County Ed O/County Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998). 
:; I.e. 67-5279(1); Stevenson v. Blaine Co., 134 Idaho 756, 759, 9 P.3d 1222. 1225 (2000) 
4 Stevenson v Blaine Co., 134 Idaho 756, 759, 9 P.3d 1222, 1225 (2000) 
BRIEF - 2 
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record.S Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity, including 
a board's application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinances. 6 
A Board's decision may only be overtumed where its findings: (a) violate statutory or 
constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon 
unlav.ful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence; or (e) are arbitrary, 
capricious. or an abuse of discretion. 7 The party attacking a zoning board's action must first 
illustrate that the board erred in a manner specified therein and then must show that a substantial 
right of the party has been prejudiced. 8 
III. 
ISSUES 
Jasso and Gorringe raise identical issues in their Petitions and in their Opening Briefs9; 
1. Whether the proposed access road to the Subdivision constitutes a 
"cul-de-sac street" more than 500 feet in length in violation of Article 4, 
Section C.7 of the Subdivision Ordinance; 
2. Whether approval of the Subdivision creates an access road across 
the Jasso and Gorringe properties in violation of Article IV, Section C.9 of 
the Subdivision Ordinance; 
3. 'Whether Mr. Dunn's application contained required infonnation 
relating to flood plains; 
4. Wl1ether the County's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
fail to satisfy the requirement for a "reasoned statement" as required by 
Idaho Code §67-6535(b); and 
> Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n v Bd. ofComm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551,554,976 P.2d 477,480 
(1999). 
6 Cowan v. Bd. ojComm'rs ofFremom County, 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 PJd 1247, 1254 (2006). 
7 I.e 67-5279 (3)(a)-(e). See also Payme River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board ofComm 'rs of Valley County, 132 
IdallO 551,554,976 P.2d 477,480 (1999) 
s Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 1254. 
9 In light of the Court's order bifurcating the issues of law and fact, the Opening Briefs do not address other issues 
raised in the Petitions, viz. adequate notice, compliance with the Camas County Comprehensive Plan, and 
consideration of the availability of public services to the property. 
BRIEF - 3 
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5. \\r11ether the COlmty's approval of the preliminary plat application 
was without a reasonable basis in law or fact sufficient for an award of 
attorney fees to Jasso and Gorringe under Idaho Code §12-117(1). 
I • .) 
The County submits that its approval of the Subdivision was reasonable-and not 
arbitrary or capricious-for numerous reasons. 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Hammer Head Access Road vs. Cul-de-Sac 
Petitioners assert that the applicant's (Patrick Dunn) subdivision application did not 
comply with the County's Article IV, Section C(7) prohibiting cul~de-sac streets over 500 feet in 
length. This code provision is inapplicable to this application. The Petitioners incorrectly 
assUme that the only legally available type of dead-end street is a cul-de-sac. While it is 
certainly true that a cul-de-sac cannot exceed five hundred feet, there are several other available 
dead-end access roads available and routinely utilized in the County including 96' cuI de sac's, 
120' hammerhead's, 60' "Y" dead ends pursuant to the International Fire Code adopted by the 
County via Ordinance #160. Further, Article IV, Section C(3) specifically provides for Stub 
Streets where it is anticipated, like here, that future connectivity may (not shall) be a viable 
option. 
In considering the application here, both the Board of Commissioners Cthe Board") and 
the County Planning & Zoning Commission ("the Commission") were concerned about the 
access road and whether it satisfied all applicable requirements of the County Code. The Board 
ultimately concluded the hammerhead design was appropriate and would best serve fire safety 
BRIEF - 4 
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and snow removal issues, 10 Pursuant to Camas County Ordinance #160 the County has adopted 
Appendix D of the 2006 edition of the International Fire Code which provides for an access road 
in the foml of a Hammerhead design to be utilized in lieu of other "dead-end" streets including a 
cul-de-sac road, Thus, the Petitioners' assertion that the applicant's subdivision application did 
not comply with Article IV, Section C(7) prohibiting cul-de-sac streets over 500 feet in length is 
irrelevant as the street in dispute is an access road and not a cul-de-sac at all. The hammerhead 
is in compliance with the applicable ordinances as a "dead-end" street at greater than 750 feet in 
length is pennitted. 
B. Access to a Public Road 
Petitioners assert that the applicant's subdivision does not comply with Article IV, 
Section C(9) which prohibits private roads except within PlalIDed Unit Developments. 
Petitioners nusinterpret this ordinance. Article IV, Section C(9) of Camas COlmty's Subdivision 
Ordinance pertains to the "Design Standards" within a subdivision. Thus it pertains to the roads 
,vithin the proposed subdivision. The evidence clearly provides that all roads within the Dunn' 
subdivision are in fact public roads. 
The Petitioners' interpretation of the provision would, if enforced by the County, be an 
ultra-vires act. While the County can of course require all roads within a proposed subdivision 
to be dedicated to the public, it could not require an applicant to dedicate property not his own 
and outside of his subdivision to the public as well. Yet, this is exactly what Petitioners 
advocate; that the road that connects the Dunn property to Baseline Road must also be dedicated 
10 The Board's Findings reflect that the issue ofrhe road design was considered by the Commission at its meetings 
of August 19, 2008 and September 2, 2008. The Board considered the issue at its January 12, 2009 meeting and 
remanded the issue back to the Commission for further consideration. The Commission again considered the road 
design (in particular the hammerhead design) at its February 3, 2009 meeting. The Board considered the 
Commission's recomm.endation on February 23,2009 and approved the Subdivision with the hammerhead design. 
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to the public by the applicant. The applicant does not possess this power and to enforce such 
requirement would preclude all property owners from exercising their constitutional right to 
develop one's property except for those fortunate property owners whose property happens to 
already abut a public road. 
This is not what the subdivision ordinance contemplates or requires. The applicable 
ordinance to this application is Article V, Section B(l) which only requires that a proposed 
subdivision have access to a public road; i.e. a landlocked subdivision is precluded, The Board 
held that the Subdivision would be required to access a public road (Baseline Road) as a 
condition of approval before building permits, certificates of occupancy, etc could be issued as 
required by the Subdivision Ordinance. The two provisions, while seemingly contradictory, 
actually together to require internal subdivision streets under the property owner's control to be 
public but allow the use of private roads, easements, etc. to access main thoroughfares. The 
validity of said private roads, easements, etc. is a condition of approval and the responsibility of 
the property owner to ensure. 
C. Adjudication of Easements is not within the authority of a County 
Contrary to Petitioners' assertions, the Board did not conclude that the easement did or 
did not constitute a "private road." Whether the easement in question supports the amount and 
type of use contemplated by Mr. Dunn is a private matter appropriately left for negotiation and 
discussion between Mr. Dunn, Mr. Jasso and the Gorringes and possibly subject to a potential 
declarative judgment action. A petition for judicial review is not the appropriate venue for such 
a dispute since the only remedy is to remand the matter back to the County. The County is 
simply not empowered to sit as an arbiter or interpreter of private agreements such as the legal 
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nature of CCR' s, private vs. public easements, etc. The County is only empowered to condition 
its approval on the applicant's compliance with Article V, Section B(l). (To be eligible for a 
building pennit, celtificate of occupancy, etc. the subdivision must have access to a public road.) 
If in a declarative judgment action between the two private parties after submission of evidence, 
the court detenllines that the private contract between the parties contemplates only a limited 
private easement, then the applicant does not comply with the County's condition of approval 
and a certificate of occupancy cannot be issued. Such evidence pertaining to a private dispute is 
not codified in the County record, nor is a county board empowered to make such an 
adjudication. Thus, the County's conditional of approval requiring access to a public road is just 
that, a condition precedent to a building peIDlit. Such a requirement is in compliance and does 
not conflict with any applicable County ordinances. 
D. Flood Plain 
The Plaintiff contends that the subdivision does not comply with Article VI, Section H 
which requires that "any proposed subdivision that is located within a floodplain" is thereafter 
subject to the myriad of additional floodplain requirements, Quite simply, as FEMA has not, as 
yet, adopted a floodplain map for this area, the County is not empowered to subject an applicant 
to these requirements. There is no evidence in the record demonstrating that this subdivision is 
located in the floodplain, nor could their be as an official FEMA map has not yet been adopted. 
Once FEMA adopts said map, many such properties may fall within the floodplain, but 
Petitioners are putting the cart before the horse as the County cannot condition approval on legal 
standards that, while codified in the Ordinance, are not as yet applicable. The limit to the 
County's authority at this juncture is as provided in the approved plat which identifies the 
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location of Fricke Creek and specifies that building envelopes must be at least 200' from the 
creek. Upon remand, the County may specifically provide in its findings that no FEMA as yet 
exists. 
E. Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law 
Petitioners object to the County's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. While the 
County agrees that "[ c ]onc1usory statements are not sufficient", the County contends that it did 
provide a clear statement of what, specifically) [the County] believes ... " and its rationale." 
Cowan v. Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P. 3d 1247 (2006). For example, the County 
specifically addressed the hammerhead dead-end street as acceptable if developed to county 
specifications and approved by the Road and Bridge Department. The County believes that 
Petitioners' objection lies in the County's alleged failure to render its judgment interpreting the 
nature of the easement. Again, the County is not empowered to render such conclusions of law. 
The Calmty is limited to and did specifically address that the easement must comply with the 
applicable code provisions providing the subdivision access to a public road. (i.e. Baseline). 
These were the "criteria and standards it considered relevant, ... [v.rith] detailed facts, and ... 
rational for its decision." ld. 
F. Attornev Fees 
Petitioner asserts that it is entitled to attorney fees as 
from the very beginning, the Petitioner advised the County that the ... plat did not 
comply with the County' 5 subdivision ordinance ... so their can be no claim .. of 
an illllOcent oversight, misunderstanding, or error when the Board approved the 
subdivision. Literally, the COlUlty ignored the Petitioner'S objections and, in so 
doing, forced him to file this Petition for Judicial Review. 
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The County did not ignore and did not via innocent oversight fail to address the subdivision 
ordinance. The County provided an in depth analysis of said provisions. The misunderstanding 
and legal error was on the part of the Petitioners, As provided, their "advice" amounted to an 
ultra-vires act. Petitioners wish merely to prevent its neighbor from exercising its constitutional 
property right in subdividing its property as provided by law. To require a property owner to 
dedicate property not his own to the public is an ultra-vires act. Petitioners refuse to read the two 
provisions in conjunction with one another ... (1) that their can be no private roads within the 
subdivision itself, i,e. the property which the applicant and the County have the power to control 
must all be public; and (2) the property ul1der the owner's control must have access, at some 
point, to a public road. i.e. the property cannot be completely landlocked accessible by air alone. 
How the applicant accomplishes this is up to the applicant so long as he complies with these 
provisions. Thus, Petitioners are not entitled to attorney fees as the County had a reasonable 
basis to interpret its ordinances as such and the Petitioners objections are simply unreasonable. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Camas County respectfully requests this Court deny the 
Petitions for Judicial Review as a matter of law. 
DATED this 20th day of July, 2009. 
MOORE SMITH BU TON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
By:............"".....:;~:::..-.--I _________ _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1..:/ day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
COlTect copy of the foregoing RESPONSE by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
James W. Phillips 
Roark Law Firm, LLP 
409 North Main Street 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Benjamin W. Worst 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C. 
P,O. Box 6962 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
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Jill S. Holinka 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
ISB Nos.: 5675,6563 
Email: pjf@msbtlaw.com 
jsh@msbtlaw.com 
Attorneys for Respondents 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH nmICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
STEPHEN JASSO, 
& 
CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
CAMAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
the state ofldaho, 
Respondent. 
Consolidated Case Nos.: CV 2009-14 & CV 
2009-15 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' 
OBJECTIONS TO MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD 
COMES NOW the Respondent, Camas County, by and through its undersigned counsel 
of record, the law firm of Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd., and hereby submits its 
Response to Petitioners' Objections to Motion to Augment Record. 
The County filed its Motion to Augment Record on July 1, 2009, requesting that 
Appendix D to the 2006 International Fire Code be included in the record. Petitioners object to 
the County's Motion on the ground that the adopting ordinance was not included in the motion. 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' OBJECTIONS TO MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - 1 
Nevertheless, Petitioners have consented to the requested augmentation, provided the adopting 
ordinance is also made part of the record. 
A certified copy of Ordinance 160, adopting the 2006 International Fire Code ("IFC"), is 
attached as Exhibit A to the Second Affidavit of Dwight Butfin in Support of Motion to Augment 
'. 
Record, filed contemporaneously herewith. The 2006 IFC and its appendices were considered 
and applied by the County in its approval of the Subdivision. 
DATED this 21 sl day of July, 2009. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
BY.]~~ 
Attorneys for Respondent 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' OBJECTIONS TO MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21stday of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' OBJECTION TO MOTION 
TO AUGMENT RECORD by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James W. Phillips 
Roark Law Firm, LLP 
409 North Main Street 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Benjamin W. Worst 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, p.e. 
P.O. Box 6962 









RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' OBJECTIONS TO MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - 3 
Paul J. Fitzer 
Jill S. Holinka 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
ISB Nos.: 5675, 6563 
Email: pjf@msbtlaw.com 
jsh@msbtlaw.com 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
STEPHEN JASSO, 
& 
CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
CAMAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of 
the state of Idaho, 
Respondent. 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Camas ) 
Consolidated Case Nos.: CV 2009-14 & CV 
2009-15 
AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN 
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
TO AUGMENT RECORD 
Dwight Butlin, being first duly sworn, sayeth as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD - 1 
1. My name is Dwight Butlin. I am over the age of 18 years, and I am of sound 
mind. The statements I make in this affidavit are made upon my own personal knowledge and 
are true to the best of my knowledge. 
2. I am the Planning and Zoning Administrator for Camas County. As such, I 
maintain a record of: (a) all land use ordinances for Camas County, including the Camas County 
Subdivision Ordinance; and (b) all international codes adopted by Camas County, including the 
International Fire Code. 
3. At the time the Fricke Creek Application was filed, in June 2008, Camas County 
had duly adopted the 2006 edition of the International Fire Code. Camas County uses the 
International Fire Code, including its appendixes, in its review of subdivision applications. 
Though the provisions in the appendixes are not mandatory, the County regularly utilizes and 
relies on the provisions in the appendixes when considering subdivision applications. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is Appendix D to the 2006 International Fire Code. 
This is a true and correct copy of the entire Appendix D existing at the time of the Fricke Creek 
Application in June 2008. 
5. Camas County regularly utilizes the guidelines in Appendix D in its review of 
subdivision applications, including the Fricke Creek Application. 
Further this affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this 1st day of July, 2009. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD - 2 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of July, 2009, ---
Motatf PUblic for Idah9 
R 'd' ~ / eSl mg at: f- a:!. , If -e: / ,j 
My commission expires: / () - / '1 - ... ~ () / ! 
AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
James W. Phillips 
Roark Law Firm, LLP 
409 North Main Street 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Benjamin W. Worst 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.e. 
P.O. Box 6962 







AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD - 4 
A.~~\~:~ 0+ 
y) 'to1. n I a ff rn 
EXHIBIT A 
t\ S "-n)O ,ct- of' 'il. .. s f<>y,J"",~--I:; 's 
~~5 
ORDINANCE NO. 160 
AN ORDINANCE OF CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, ADOPTING TIlE LATEST EDITION OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL BUILDING CODE (IBC), THE INTERNATIONAL RESIDENTIAL 
CODE (IRC), PARTS I-IV AND IX, THE INTERNATIONAL FIRE CODE, (IFC) AND THE 
INTERNA TIONAL ENERGY CONSERVATION CODE; EXEMPTING RESIDENTIAL 
DECKING AND FENCING FROM THE mc, THE IRC, THE IFC AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY CODE; PROVIDING A DEFINITION OF A RESIDENTIAL 
STORAGE SHED; REQUIRING SNOW LOAD REQUIREMENTS TO BE ENGINEERED 
FOR ALL DWELLINGS ANDIOR BUILDINGS REQUIRING A BUILDING PERMIT; 
ESTABLISHING REQUIREMENTS FOR PERMANENT FOUNDATIONS FOR 
STRUCTURES USED AS A PERMANENT DWELLING; REPEALING ALL 
ORDINANCE(S) IN CONFLICT; PROVIDING FOR CONFLICTS OF LAW, 
SEVERABILITY, SAVING PROVISIONS AND AMENDMENTS. 
BE IT ORDAINED by the Board of County Commissioners, Camas County, Idaho; 
SECTION 1: Adoption and Election to Enforce the Latest Edition of the mc, IRC Parts 
I-IV and IX, International Fire Code and the International Energy Conservation Code 
A. Code Adoption: That the approved editions of the following nationally recognized 
codes as adopted by the State of Idaho or the Idaho Building Code Board, are the official 
building codes of Camas County, Idaho except as provided in Section B; 
International Fire Code 
International Building Code 
International Residential Code, parts I-IV and IX 
International Energy Conservation Code 
The adopted versions of the foregoing codes shall be deemed superseded by successive versions 
of such codes as they are adopted by the Idaho Building Code Board effective on the date any 
such codes are made effective by the Idaho Building Code Board and lor the State Fire Marshall. 
B. Amendments To Adopted Codes: That the following amendments shall be 
applicable to the adopted building codes: 
A ~ dCLL> '\\ 
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I. To the International Building Code: 
a. Section 101.1 shall be amended by inserting County of Camas 
b. Delete mc Sections 10 1.4.1 and 2701.1 for referenced 
standard for electrical installation provisions, and any 
reference to codes and standards dealing with electrical 
installations which shall be governed by the codes and 
standards as established by Idaho Code 54-1001 
c. Delete mc Sections 101.4.4 and 2901.1 for referenced 
standard for plumbing installations which shall be governed by 
the codes and standards as established by Idaho Code 54-260 
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2. To the Intemational Residential Code. excepting Parts VII and VIII: 
a. Section RIO 1.1 shall be amended by inserting County of Camas 
b. Amend IRC Table R 30 1.2( I) Climate and Geographic Design 
Criteria as established by the Building Official and set forth in 
the Camas County building regulations. 
c. Amending Section R 301.2.3, Snow Loads to read as follows: 
Roof Snow Load Requirements (for buildings that require a 
Camas County building permit): 
1) All structures must be engineered per IRC 301.2.3. 
3. To the Intemational Energy Conservation Code, as hereby amended: 
a. Amended IECC Section 101.1 inserting County of Camas 
C. Exemptions: These codes shall not apply to: 
1. Residential decking (less than 30 inches from grade), and fencing less 
than 6 feet in height, but shall remain subject to placement requirements 
established by zoning regulations and; 
2. Nothing herein shall act to eliminate the requirement of a building permit 
for these structures. 
SECTION 2: Requirements and Exemptions for Permanent Foundations for Structures 
Used as a Permanent Dwelling: 
A. All structures used as a permanent dwelling shall be permanently affixed to a 
permanent foundation and said foundation shall meet the building code requirements as set forth 
in the International Residential Code and/or the building code as adopted by Camas County. The 
requirement for permanent foundation dwelling structures shall not include recreational vehicles 
or travel trailers. 
SECTION 3: Repeal of Previous Ordinances: It is the intention of Camas County that 
all prior ordinances and parts of ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby repealed. 
SECTION 4: Conflicts of Law: 
A. These regulations are not intended to interfere with, abrogate or annul any other 
ordinance, rule or regulation, statute or other provision of law. Where any provision of law, 
whichever provisions are more restrictive or impose higher standards shall control. 
B. These regulations are not inten<;led to abrogate any easement, covenant or any 
other private agreement or restriction; provided, that where the provisions of these regulations 
are more restrictive or impose higher standards or regulations than such easement, covenant, or 
other private agreement or restriction, the requirements of these regulations shall govern. Where 
the provisions of the easement, covenant or private agreement or restriction impose duties and 
obligation of these regulations or the determinations of the County in approving a subdivision or 
in enforcing these regulations, and such private provisions are not consistent with these 
regulations or determinations there under, then such private provisions shall be operative and 
of' ~~s~~n~~J 
supplemental to these regulations and determinations made there under but cannot be enforced 
by the County. 
SECTION 5: Severability: 
If any part of any provision to these regulations or application thereof to any person or 
circumstances is adjudged invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, such judgment shall be 
confined in its operation to the part, provision, or application directly involved in all controversy 
in which such judgment shall have been rendered and shall not affect or impair the validity of the 
remainder of these regulations or the application thereof to other persons or circumstances. The 
County hereby declares that it would have enacted the remainder of these regulations even 
without any such part, provision or application. 
SECTION 6: Saving Provisions: 
These regulations shall not be construed as abating any action now pending under, or by 
virtue of, prior existing subdivision regulations, or as discontinuing, abating, modifying, or 
altering any penalty accruing or about to accrue, or as affecting the liability of any person, firm 
or corporation, or as waiving any right of the municipality under any section or provision 
existing at the time of adoption of these regulations, or as vacating or annulling any rights 
obtained by any person, firm or corporation, by lawful action of the municipality except as shall 
be expressly provided for in these regulations. 
PASSED BY the Board of County Commissioners of Camas County, Idaho this 28 th day 
of July, 2008. 
CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
ATTEST: 
;2~~. 
Rollie Berui.ett, County Clerk 
;:: tl/-
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The Petitioner, Stephen V. Jasso, submits this Reply in 
support of his Petition For Judicial Review. The Petitioner will 
address the issues in the same order discussed in the Respondent1s 
Response. 
A. Fricke Creek Road is a cul-de~sac st.reet over 500 feet in 
PETITIONER JASSO'S REPLY - 1 
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length. Therefore, it is prohibited under the Subdivision Ordinance 
and an IFC compliant hammerhead turn-around space at its terminus 
does not change that. 
The Responderit argues that the provision of the Subdivi-
sion which prohibits cul-de-sacs over 500 feet long is inapplicable 
because the terminus is a turn-around that complies with the 
International Fire Code as adopted by Camas County Ordinance 160 
("IFC"). This argument is fatally flawed. 
First, Ordinance 160 was adopted after the filing of the 
Fricke Creek Subdivision application. The Fricke Creek application 
was filed on June 2, 2008 (R., p. 47). Ordinance 160 was adopted on 
July 28, 2008. The law is well established in Idaho that it is the 
law in effect at the time of the filing of an application that 
governs. Payette River Property Owner Ass'n v. Valley County, 132 
Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999), and Cooper v. Ada County, 101 Idaho 
407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980). Therefore, Ordinance 160 is not applica-
ble to the application in question. Also, for the sake of the 
record, the Petitioner has not consented to the ordinance becoming 
part of the Record. 
Second, even if the IFC ordinance was applicable, the 
agreement ignores that plain language of Article IV, Section C(7) 
prohibiting cul-de-sacs greater than 500 feet in length, and the 
specific definition of Cul-de-sac which reads: 
(f) Cul-de-sac A street connected to another street 
at one end only and provided with a turn-around 
space at its terminus. 
The approved Subdivision Plat (R., p. 236) shows Fricke 
Creek Road (a) is connected at one end oniy to another street 
(Baseline Road) and (b) has a turn-around space provided at its 
terminus. Therefore, by definition it is a cul-de-sac street. Also 
the Plat established it is greater than 500 feet in length. The 
fact that the turn-around has a design referred to as a "hammer-
head" in the IFC does has no effect since shape of the terminus 
does not change the Subdivision definition of cul-de-sac. 
PETITIONER JASSO'S REPLY - 2 
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Also, the Respondent argues that Fricke Creek Road does 
not violate the prohibition against cul-de-sacs over 500 feet long 
because it is a .. stub street" under Article IV, Section C (3). This 
contention is also misplaced. 
First, as a matter of statutory construction, the general 
requirement regarding "stub streets" does not supersede the 
specific prohibition against cul-de-sacs over 500 feet long. 
Second, the purpose of stub streets is to provide access 
from streets within a proposed subdivision to adjacent undeveloped 
land for future development. Such streets are a dead-end streets 
without a turn-around at the end: hence the name "stub streets." On 
the other hand, the purpose of cul-de-sac streets is to provide 
vehicular and emergency vehicle access to the lots within the 
Subdivision: hence the requirement for a turn around at the end. 
While a cul-de-sac may provide access to adjoinirig lands that does 
not change its specific definition or the prohibition against its 
excessive length. 
To read the stub street provision as trumping the cul-de-
sac prohibition is to negate that clear prohibition against cul-de-
sac streets over 500 feet in length. The two provisions, when read 
together and giving each effect, require "stub streets," if 
appropriate, but streets wi th a turn-around at the end are, by 
definition, cul-de-sacs and cannot exceed 500 feet in length. 
B. Access to a Public Road/Prohibition Against Pr~vate Streets 
The Respondent argtleS that Article IV, Section (9), which 
prohibits private roads, does not apply to roads outside the 
Subdivision because Article IV is entitled "Design Standards." 
However, the Subdivision Ordinance is organized so that, regardless 
of the location of the improvements, Article IV, t'Design Stan-
dards" I contains the general requirements for the design of 
improvements, and Article V, n Improvement Standards It, the standards 
for the construction of those improvements. 
Section (9) of Design Standards prohibits private roads 
\..;i th the sole exception of roads "wi thin planned unit develop-
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ments." It does not provide an exception for any other situation. 
The Respondent argues that it can only require dedication 
of streets within a subdivision and, therefore, the prohibition 
against private streets can only apply to such streets. However, 
this is a "straw-man" argument because the prohibition against 
private roads is not a requirement to force the dedication of land, 
rather it is a requirement to ensure public access to the lots 
created within a subdivision, unrestricted by limitations in 
private easement agreements. This prohibition promotes the legiti-
mate governmental interest of unrestricted public access to the 
lots for the protection of the purchasers and residents as well as 
the benefit of the general public. 
Next, the Respondent argues that Article V, Section B{l), 
permits "private roads, easements, etc." to access a Subdivision, 
the validity of which is a condition of approval and the responsib-
ility of the property owner to ensure. However, to the contrary, 
Section B(l), consistent with Section (9), provides that no 
subdivision shall be developed without access to a public street or 
road. It is uncontroverted that Fricke Creek Road does not access 
to a public street or road, but rather it accesses to the private 
easement on the Petitioner's property. 
If the requirement is read not to require direct access 
to a public street, then any requirement for dedicated public 
streets within the subdivision is rendered illusory. This is 
because to have public access to the streets within a subdivision 
there must be uninterrupted public access from there to another 
public street. 
Finally, the Respondent's arguments on this issue are not 
based upon any specific findings, conclusions or analysis of the 
Board's Decision of February 23,2009 (R., p.4) ("Decision") or its 
Findings of facts and conclusions of law of March 6,2009 (R., p.l) 
( "Findings" ) . 
c. Adjudication o£ Easements is not within the authority. of 
the County. 
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On this point we agree. However, by approving the 
Subdivision the County has essentially, and improperly, determined 
those private rights for the purposes of subdivision: that Fricke 
Creek Road across the Jasso Property is a "public road" and not a 
prohibited "private road." 
D. Flood Plain 
To no one's surprise, the Plat (R' T p. 202 and p. 236) 
shows Fricke Creek running through the aptly named Fricke Creek 
Subdivision. However, the Application does not contain the required 
floodplain information or environmental impact statement. 
The Respondent argues the flood plain information is not 
required because n(t)here is no evidence i:o'the demonstrating that 
this subdivision is located in the floodplain, nor could their 
(sic) be as an official FEMA map has not yet been adorted." This 
agreement fails for several reaSons. 
First r the requirement' is not that the information be 
provided only for areas shown on an official FEMA map. Rather, it 
is required for the subdivisions within or adjacent to the tlflood 
plain" which, by definition f includes the channel, floodway and 
floodway fringe, "as established per the engineering practices as 
specified by the Army Corps of Engineers" (emphasis added). 
In this case, the location of the channel (part of the 
"floodplain" by definition) does not need to be determined because 
the applicant has shown it on the Plat. What is not identified are 
the boundaries of the floodway and flood fringe areas using the 
engineering practices specified by the Army Corp of. Engineers. 
However, that omission does not remove the Application from having 
to provide the required flood plain data. 
In addition, the Board was advised during the proceedings 
'that the County's Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan contains a Camas 
County Projected Flood Zone and FEMA Flood Zone Map (R., p. 182) 
which includes Fricke Creek. Also, the Idaho Fish and Game letter 
advised the Board that Fricke Creek experiences high flows during 
spring run off. (R., p. 140). While this may not be dispositive of 
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the flood plain issues, it does underscore that there were issues 
of fact regarding the flood plain which the Board chose ignore 
rather than address a~ th~y were required to by Idaho Code 67-6535. 
As a result, the Board's Findings, and Decision lack any finding of 
fact, conclusion of law or analysis regarding the flood plain. 
E. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
The County's Response does provide a valid defense for 
the Board's failure to make findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and the analysis required by Idaho Code 67-6535. That statute, in 
pertinent part, reads: 
(b) The approval or denial of any application provided 
for in this chapter shall be in writing and accompanied 
by a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and 
standards considered relevant, states the relevant Con-
tested facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for 
the decision based on the applicable provisions of the 
comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance· and . statutory 
provisions, pertinent constitutional ~rinciples and 
factual information contained in the record. (emphasis 
added) 
The County just makes the assertion that its Findings, 
and Decision meet those requirements. It supports this contention 
with the single reference that it "specifically addressed the 
hammerhead dead-end street as acceptable if developed to county 
specifications and approved by the Road and Bridge Department." It 
cites in support of its Findings the decision of Cowan v. Fremont 
County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P. 3d 1247 (2006). Yet, the County's 
Findings were nothing more than a list of documents in the record 
and conclusory statements, which are contrary to the basic rule of 
law cited in the Cowan that: 
"Conclusory statements are not sufficient; instead 
what is needed ... is a clear statement of what, 
specifically, the decisionmaking body believes, 
after hearing and considering all of the evidence, 
to be the relevant and important facts upon which 
its decision is based" 
In the Findings of Fact (R., p.l) there are just two 
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meager references to the Fricke Creek Road. First, is Finding No. 
18, which says the Board remanded the subdivision back to the p&Z 
Commission on the reconfiguration of the road, and second is 
Finding No. 19, which says the ComIl1ission recommended the new 
configuration of the hammerhead. Neither of those "findings" is 
anything more than a description of the proceedings. The P&Z 
reconunendation dealt only with the hammerhead design being accept-
able to the Commission and not anything else about the road (R., 
pgs. 10-11). There is not one specific finding of underlying fact 
with regard to Fricke Creek Road, much less any explanation of the 
criteria and standards considered relevant or rationale/analysis 
in the Board I S Findings or Decision. Ironically, the County 's 
citation to the COltlan decision only underscores that the County did 
not meet, as a matter of law, eyen the ~~sic requirements with 
regard to its Findings, and Decision. 
Compliance with the requirements of Idaho Code 67-6535, 
is not some troublesome, technical requirement that can be ignored 
by the County. Those are the fundamental requirements of constitu-
tional due process in quasi-judicial proceeding such as this. 
Cooper v. Ada County, infra p. 2. These constitutional principles 
have been codified by the Idaho Legislature beginning with enact-
ment of the Local Land Use Planning Actin 1975, and proyide the 
statutory framework local decision makers must follow in making 
quasi-judicial decisions. Such statutory requirements not only 
protect fundamental constitutional rights, but provide a framework 
for making proper and reasoned land use decisions. 
Besides protecting constitutional rights , it is important 
to consider the other legislative purposes behind statutes, such as 
Idaho Code 67-6535. The decision of Topanga Association For A 
Scenic Community v. County of Las Angles, 11 Cal.3d 506, 522 p.2d 
12 (1974), contains a scholarly discussion of the purposes of such 
statutory requirements, including: 
1. to provide a legal framework for making reasoned 
and principled decisions; 
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2. to help make legally relevant conclusions, and 
orderly analysis, and reduce the likelihood the 
governmental entity will randomly leap from evi-
dence to conclusion; 
3. serve to help enhance the integrity of the 
process and persuade the parties that the decision-
making process is careful, reasoned, and equitable; 
4. enable the parties to determine whether and on 
what basis they should seek judicial review; and, 
5. appraise the reviewing court of the basis for 
the decision. 
In conclusion on this point, since the Board's Findings, 
and Decision are totally deficient, the Decision must be vacated. 
F. Attorney Fees 
On this issue, the Respondent mis-characterizes the 
Petitioner's straightforward objections to the Subdivision as "ad-
vice" to have the County conunit "an ultra-vires" act: presumaply 
requiring dedication of property the developer did not own. The 
Respondent then vilifies this "advice" as ~iven to prevent Mr. Dunn 
from "exercising his constitutional property right in subdividing 
his property." This is truly a disingenuous argument: one without 
any basis in fact. 
Mr. Jasso never advised the County to require dedicatIon 
of that portion of Fricke Creek Road within the private access 
easement. Mr. Jasso never claimed the County had the power to do 
so. To the contrary, he advised the County that Dunn had the right 
to access and develop his property subject to the limitations of 
the private easement, one of which is that the road could not be 
dedicated or used by the County as a public road (R., pgs. 177 and 
205). These facts underscore the groundless and unfair nature of 
the County's argument that Mr. Jasso was attempting to force the 
County into committing some unlawful act to deprive Mr. Dunn of his 
property rights. 
What Mr. Jasso actually did throughout the review process 
(along with other people) was raise specific objections where the 
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Subdivision Application did not comply with the Subdivision 
Ordinance. 
What did the Board do? The Board ignored the issues 
raised. The Board ignored the statutorily mandated decision-making 
process. The Board approved the Subdivision without making its 
Decision in the reasoned manner required by Idaho Code 67-6535. In 
doing so, the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and 
deprived Mr. Jasso of fundamental constitutional and statutory 
rights. To protect those rights and make the Board comply with the 
law, Mr. Jasso had to seek this judicial review and incur attorney 
fees in doing so. 
Rather than admit its mistakes, the Board is still trying 
to justify it's actions with arguments based on matters not found 
ln the Findings or Decision. Such arguments cannot be legitimately 
advanced in support of, much less to uphold, the Decision. 
With each step in its course of conduct, the Board has 
made Mr. Jasso incur attorney fees to protect his rights, to have 
the County correct its mistakes and violations of law, and to 
prevent the County from acting in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. Since the purpose of I.C. Section 12-117 is (I) to serve as 
a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary action, and (2) to provide 
a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified finan-
cial burdens attempting to correct mistakes agencies should have 
never made, Mr. Jasso is entitled to an award of his attorney fees. 
DATED this ~day of July, 2009 
Respectfully submitted, 
by 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the~day of July, 2009, I faxed a copy of 
the foregoing document to the following: 
Mr. Paul Fitzer 
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucke, Chtd 
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Via Fax: 208-331-1202 
attorney for Camas County, Idaho 
Ben Worst 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum ID 83340 
Via Fax: 208-622-2755 
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe 
Dated: l' 2 1- Of 
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JAMES W. PHILLIPS 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
Attorneys at Law 
409 N. Main St. 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
208/788-2427 
ISB # 1520 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 










CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the ) 






CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, ) 






CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the ) 





Case Nos. CV-2009-14 
and CV-2009-15 
REQUEST FOR SETTING OF 
ORAL AGRUEMENT 
COMES NOW, Stephen V. Jasso, the above-named petitioner, 
by and through James W. Phillips of The Roark I,avl Firm, his 
attorneys of record, and hereby requests this Court to set this 
matter for oral agruement at the the Court's chambers in Hailey, 
MOTION TO COMPEL SETTLING AND LODGING 
OF RECORD WITH COURT - 1 
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Idaho_ fit 
DATED this ;;Z 1 day of July I 2009. 
THE 
MOTION TO COMPEL SETTLING AND LODGING 
OF RECORD WITH COURT - 2 
--~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify 
foregoing document to 
t11 
that the J.l-day of July I 2009, I fax~d the 
the following: 
Mr. Paul Fitzer 
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucke, Chtd 
950 w. Bannock, Ste. 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No. 208-331-1202 
attorney for Camas County, Idaho 
Ben Worst 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum ID 83340 
Fax No. 208-622-2755 
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe 
Dated: J - L"1- tX( 
MOTION TO COMPEL SETTLING AND LODGING 
OF RECORD WITH COURT - 3 
llips 
for Petitioner 
Benjamin W. Worst, ISB#5639 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.c. 
371-A Walnut Avenue North 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 622-6699 
Facsimile: (208) 726-8116 
benworst@cox.net 
Attorney for Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
***** 






CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political ) 





CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, husband ) 






CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political ) 




Case No. CV 2009-14 
Case No. CV-2009-15 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO CAMAS COUNTY'S 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 
IRCP 84(1) 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' MOTION 
TO AUGMENT RECORD - 1 
COME NOW Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe, husband and wife ("Gorringes"), by 
and through Benjamin W. Worst of the law firm Benjamin W. Worst, P.c., their attorney of 
record, and submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Camas County's Response to Petitioners' 
Motion to Augment Record objecting to such Response for the following reasons: 
Counsel for Camas County argues that, "Petitioners have consented to the requested 
augmentation .... " This is not accurate. Gorringes consent only to "augmentation of the record 
with the applicable Zoning Ordinance .... " See Gorringes' Memorandum In Opposition to 
Camas County's Motion to Augment Record, p. 2, on file in this action. Gorringes made it clear 
that Camas County must demonstrate that the subject International Fire Code Appendix is part of 
such applicable Ordinance. 
On its face, Camas County Ordinance No. 160, attached to the Affidavit of Dwight Butlin In 
Support of Respondent's Motion to Augment Record on file in this action, was passed by the 
County Commissioners on July 28, 2008. See ButZin Affidavit, Exhibit A, page 3. Nonetheless, 
the subject preliminary plat application was submitted almost two months earlier on June 2, 
2008. See Finding No.2, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record Document No.2. In 
Idaho, the ordinances and plans in effect at the time of application govern the application, not 
ordinances passed subsequent to the application. South Fork Coalition v. Board of Comm'rs of 
Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857, 792 P.2d 882 (1990). Thus, on its face, Camas County 
Ordinance No. 160 is not "the applicable Zoning Ordinance". 
Accordingly, if Camas County can locate the applicable zoning ordinance, Gorringes will 
consent to augmentation of the record with the same. If Camas County can clearly demonstrate 
that it incorporated the 2006 International Fire Code Appendix D into such ordinance, Gorringes 
will consent to augmentation of the record with that Appendix as well. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' MOTION 
TO AUGMENT RECORD - 2 C< ~-3 
Ju. _ 
DATED this pay Of~, 2009 . 
. BENiAMIN W. WORST, p.e. 
Benjamm W. Worst, 
Attorney for Petitioners Gorringe 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.p. ~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this );l day of  • 2009. I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOS ION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Mr. Paul Fitzer, Esq. 
Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turke 
950 West Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Mr. Patrick Dunn 
35211 Palmeter Lane SE 
Snoqualmie, Washington 98065 
James W. Phillips 
The Roark Law Firm 
409 N. Main St. 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail / 
00 Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 ~. 
I 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
~Facsimile: ( ) ~I 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail I 
(>9 Facsimile: (208) 788-3918 t::.1N.I 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, p.e. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO AMAS COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' MOTION 
TO AUGMENT RECORD - 3 ~ 'i 4' 
Benjamin W. Worst, ISB#5639 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C. 
371-A Walnut Avenue North 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 622-6699 
Facsimile: (20S) 726-S116 
benworst@cox.net 
Attorney for Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
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COME NOW Petitioners Curtis and Camie Gorringe, husband and wife ("Gorringes"), by 
and through Benjamin W. Worst of the law firm Benjamin W. Worst, P.c., their attorney of 
record, and submit this Rebuttal Brief in opposition to Camas County's Response Brief. 
I. LABELLING IT A "HAMMERHEAD" DOES NOT EXEM PT THE ROAD FROM 
ANALYSIS UNDER THE SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE - IT IS STILL A 
PROHIDITED CUL-DE-SAC. 
The Court must apply the plain language of Camas County Ordinance No. 152 
(the"Subdivision Ordinance") which clearly defines the road depicted on the approved 
preliminary plat as a "cul-de-sac". Where a statute is unambiguous, statutory construction is 
unnecessary and courts are free to apply the plain meaning of the statute. Martin v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244,246,61 P.3d 601,603 (2002). The Subdivision Ordinance 
defines a "cul-de-sac" as follows, "(f) Cul-de-sac - A street connected to another street at one end 
only and provided with a turn-around space at its terminus." Camas County Ordinance No. 152, 
Article III, Section B. The plat map speaks for itself. 
The preliminary plat clearly indicates that "Fricke Creek Road" is connected to another 
street at one end only. The "hammerhead" is nothing more than a turn-around space at its 
terminus. If the Court agrees that the road is a "cul-de-sac", such road "shall not be more than 
500 feet in length." Camas County Ordinance No. 152, Article IV, Section C.7. In its current 
configuration, Fricke Creek Road is over 3,000 feet in length just within the proposed 
subdivision and substantially longer before it connects with another road beyond the Gorringe 
and Jasso properties. 
Even if the 2006 International Fire Code, Appendix D were applicable in the case at 
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hand1, such Fire Code Appendix does not trump the Subdivision Ordinance. Appendix D does 
nothing more than provide minimum design standards if, and only if, dead end streets are 
allowed. In this instance, the Subdivision Ordinance clearly prohibits dead end streets longer 
than 500', so Appendix D has no application. 
A glance at the preliminary plat confirms that Fricke Creek Road violates the Subdivision 
Ordinance. Nonetheless, Camas County made no effort to reconcile the obvious discrepancy 
between the plain language of the Subdivision Ordinance and the configuration of the proposed 
road by adopting any Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law explaining the County's rationale. 
This, in spite of Gorringes' repeated demands in writing and verbally at multiple public hearings 
that Camas County correct the obvious oversight. Established case law in Idaho is clear that 
mere recitations of evidence and conclusory statements will not satisfy LLUPA's requirement for 
a "reasoned statement". See Cowen v. Board of Comm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 
503, 148 P.3d 1247, 1257 (2006) and Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 
72, 76, 156 P.3d 573, 577 (2007). 
Camas County claims in its "Response" that it, "specifically addressed the hammerhead 
dead-end street .... " County's Response, p. 8. The Conclusion of Law in question reads as 
follows: "The subdivision road is to be built to county specifications including culverts, signage 
and hammerhead and approved by the Road and Bridge Department." Record Doc. No.3, 
emphasis added. Camas County made no finding that the road is not a cul-de-sac let, nor did it 
make any attempt to accompany such finding with some rational explanation of how the road, 
1 The Affidavit of Dwight Butlin in Support of Motion to Augment Record includes as Exhibit A Camas 
County Ordinance No. 160 which on its face indicates that it was passed on July 28,2008. The 
application in the case at hand was filed on June 2, 2008, almost two months before such ordinance was 
passed. In Idaho, the ordinances and plans in effect at the time of application govern, not ordinances 
passed subsequent to the application. South Fork Coalition v. Board of Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 
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which is so obviously a cul-de-sac, is not as it appears. Camas County never got to the level of 
mere recitations and conclusory statements, it ignored the issue completely leaving Gorringes' 
assertions and the evidence on the record unrebutted. In failing to make adequate Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of law in the face of clear evidence and repeated arguments to the contrary, 
Camas County violated the Gorringes' right to due process. 
II. THE APPROVAL CONVERTS A PRIVATE EASEMENT INTO A PRIVATE STREET 
All parties agree that the Subdivision Ordinance prohibits private streets in subdivisions. 
Camas County Ordinance No. 153, Article II, Section B. The preliminary plat approval creates a 
public island (the street as it passes through the subdivision) alone in a private sea (the only 
access is across the Gorringe and Jasso properties). This public inholding draws the uninvited 
public across the private easement thereby inviting the general public to trespass and converting 
the easement to a private street. Under the Subdivision Ordinance, a" private street" is a, "street 
that is not accepted for public use or maintenance which provides vehicular and pedestrian access 
(See page 30 of Camas County, Idaho Street Standards)." Camas County Ordinance No. 153, 
Article II, Section B. 
Assuming that "Fricke Creek Road" as depicted on the preliminary plat is public 2, as a 
practical matter, such public street will draw the general public across the private easements over 
the Gorringe and Jasso properties. Without compensating Jasso and the Gorringes for a taking, 
the County cannot convert the private easement into a public street, nonetheless the expanded 
117 Idaho 857, 792 P.2d 882 (1990). 
2 Although the word "public" appears in parentheses after the words "Fricke Creek Road" on the 
approved preliminary plat, plat note no. 7 states that "Fricke Creek Loop" will be privately owned and 
maintained roads (by Homeowners Association) with public access." See Record, Doc. No. 236. 
Presumably this is a mistake, but again, one cannot be certain because Camas County made no finding 
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usage caused by the new subdivision creates a de facto private street in violation of the 
Subdivision Ordinance. Here again, without comment and leaving testimony to the contrary on 
the record unrebutted, the County failed to make any Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law to 
address this issue, not even a conclusory statement or mere recitation of evidence. 
ill. CAMAS COUNTY HAS APPLICABLE FLOODPLAIN CRITERIA IN THE 
SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE, IT JUST CHOSE TO IGNORE THAT CRITERIA. 
Camas County is not excused, as it argues, from obtaining mandatory floodplain information 
and evaluating that information simply because no FEMA floodplain map has been adopted for 
the area. Like the dispute over the road, Camas County need look no further than its own 
Subdivision Ordinance to resolve floodplain issues. The relevant portions of the Subdivision 
Ordinance state as follows: 
SECTION B. MEANING OF TERMS OR WORDS. 
• FLOOD PLAIN: The relatively flat area or low land adjoining the 
channel of a river, stream, lake or other body of water which has been 
or may be covered by water of a flood of one hundred year frequency. 
The flood plain includes the channel, floodway, and floodway fringe, 
as established per the engineering practices as specified by the 
Army Corps of Engineers as follows: 
a. "Flood of one hundred year frequency" shall mean a flood magnitude 
that has a one percent (1 %) chance of being equaled or exceeded in 
any given year. 
b. "Flood" shall mean the temporary inundation of land by overflow 
from a river, stream, lake or other body of water. 
c. "Channel" shall mean the natural or artificial watercourse of 
perceptible extent, with defmite bed and banks to confine and conduct 
continuously or periodically flowing water. 
d. "Floodway" shall mean the channel or a watercourse and those 
portions of the flood plain adjoining the cahnnel, which are 
reasonably required to carry and discharge the flood water of any 
which addresses the issue. 
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watercourse. 
e. "Flood Fringe" shall mean that part of the flood plain that is beyond 
the floodway. Such areas will include those portions of the flood 
plain which will be inundated by a flood of one hundred year 
frequency but which may be developed when such development will 
not have a significant effect upon the floodwater carrying capacity of 
the floodway and the flood water levels. Shallow flood depths and 
low velocities of water flow characterize such areas. 
Camas County Ordinance No. 153, Article II, Section B. (emphasis 
added). 
This definition does not require the County to formally adopt a FEMA map, rather the 
Subdivision Ordinance defines the flood plain in accordance with engineering practices. Again, 
Camas County adopted no finding of fact or conclusion of law relevant to the issue in spite of 
unrebutted evidence and argument on the record indicating that the property is in the floodplain. 
Camas County alleges that there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that the 
subdivision is located in the floodplain even though the name of the subdivision is "Fricke Creek 
Subdivision", the approved preliminary plat includes arrows to demonstrate the flow line and 
channel of Fricke Creek (Record Doc. No. 236) and the Staff Report dated July 15, 2008, states 
that Fricke Creek crosses the property from north to south and is a "seasonal creek". Staff 
Report, Record No. 146. As if this were not enough evidence to trigger some inquiry into the 
floodplain issues, the Idaho Department of Fish and Game stated in its letter dated February 1, 
2008 that, "Fricke Creek can experience high flows during spring run-off events." Record No. 
140, emphasis added. 
In his August 13, 2008 letter to the County Commissioners, attorney Christopher Simms 
argued on behalf of the Gorringes that the Subdvision is in the floodplain and therefore subject to 
floodplain analysis under the Camas County Subdivision Ordinance and Multi-Hazard 
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Mitigation Plan. Record Doc. No. 182. Simms went so far as to direct Camas County in writing 
to the appropriate map. "The Board of Commissioners adopted the Multi-Hazard Mitigation 
Plan, which by its terms is integrated into the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. The 
Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan contains in Section 1.2.4, figure 4.5 on page 59, the floodplain 
overlay map." Record Doc. No. 182. 
As usual, Camas County ignored all of this evidence, brushed off the Gorringes' concerns 
and made no fmdings of fact or conclusions of law which address this issue. The County could 
have required some rebuttal evidence that the property is not in the floodplain "per the 
engineering practices as specified by the Army Corps of Engineers" and then made a finding to 
that effect, but shrugged it off and in so doing, failed to provide a "reasoned statement" as 
required by LLUP A. That Camas County failed to meet its obligation to provide a "reasoned 
statement" becomes even more apparent when one considers the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis 
in Crown Point. "Additionally, several of the findings consist of nothing more than a recitation 
of testimony given in the record. By reciting testimony, a court or agency does not find a fact 
unless the testimony is unrebutted in which case the court or agency should so state." Crown 
Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 76, 156 P.3d 573, 577 (2007) (emphasis 
added). 
In the case at hand the Court is presented with the opposite scenario from that in Crown 
Point i.e., Gorringes testified that the property is in the floodplain and that critical floodplain was 
required; however, Camas County failed to rebut this testimony. Staff, the neighbors and other 
state agencies all presented evidence and argument that the Subdivision is located within the 
floodplain; however, Camas County made no finding on the issue leaving the evidence in the 
record that the property is located within the floodplain unrebutted in violation of Gorringes' 
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right to due process. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES. 
In arguing against an award of attorney fees for its failure to act with a reasonable basis in 
fact or law, the County is so bold as to claim it "provided an in depth analysis" of its 
Subdivision Ordinance. See County's Response Brief, p. 9, emphasis added. The Gorringes 
would have been delighted with an in depth analysis and an honest application of the law. 
They might have even accepted a mediocre analysis with a weak application of the law. 
However, Gorringes are before this Court now because Camas County completely ignored 
the Gorringes, made light of their serious concerns, ignored the law, and did as it pleased 
meeting the legal standard for failure to act with a reasonable foundation in fact or law. 
"Wholly ignoring the provisions of its own ordinances amounts to a failure to act with a 
reasonable basis in fact or law." Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 
1091, 1098 (2005). As a result of Camas County's disregard for their rights, Gorringes have 
born an unfair and wholly unjustified financial burden attempting to correct mistakes Camas 
County never would have made if it had made even a weak attempt to satisfy the bare 
minimum requirements of the law. Now, Gorringes ask the Court to make that right. 
""" -.... ~,....--
DATED this nday of Jso/ ,2009. 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C. 
Attorney At Law 
enjamin W. Worst, 
Attorney for Petitioners Gorringe 
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9:22 Case called. Time for oral argument. Two additions to Augment Record. 
Attorneys present .Mrs. Helinka, representing Camas County, Jim Phillips, representing 
Jasso, Ben Worst, representing Gorringe. 
Jim Phillips on his motion to augment. Motion Granted 
County withdraws its motion in regards to fire code. 
9:26 Ben Worst on Oral argument. 
In regards to road/culdesac. 
9:25 In regards to the flood plain. Is it in a flood plain? 
Mandates of LUPA. 
In regards to County's Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law. 
9:43 In regards to request for attorneys fees. 
9:45 Jim Phillips - Oral argument. 
Makes correction. Reply brief, page 6. 
In regards to commissioners approach to this application and findings of fact. 
9:56 Mrs. Helinka, Back ground. County applying & interrupting its own ordinance. 
In regards to private road vs public road. 
Judge speaks re: Ord. private road vs public, road & utility easement. 
Mrs. Helinka gives her view on the ordinance meaning. 
Re: Access to a public road. 
Judge Elgee re: adjoining property owners private easement. 
Mrs. Helinka, County has no specific finding regarding easement. 
Judge Elgee questions Mrs. Helinka on some facts on the preliminary plat map. 
10:22 Mrs. Helinka In regards to the road/culdesac, State Fire Codes - Hammerhead 
design. 
10:26 Judge Elgee in regards to road connecting to Princess Mine Rd. If it meets the 
definition of a culdesac. Ord. says it can't be over 500 ft long. 
10:30 Mrs.Helinka with respect to Fire code, and fire access. 
10:32 Mrs.Helinka with respect to the flood plain, map, FEMA. 
10:34 Mrs.Helinka with respect to request for attorneys fees, feels premature. 
10:36 Mrs.Helinka with respect to findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
10:42 Mr.Worst's rebuttal argument. Failure to give his clients due process. 
10:46 Mr. Phillip's rebuttal argument. County ignored its own ordinance. 
10:49 Judge Elgee will take this under advisement. First issue is that it is a street over 500 
ft long. Second issue is the easement/public access. Third issue flood plain. 
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CV-2009-1S 
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S 
MOTION TO AUGMENT THE 
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Petitioner, Stephen V. Jasso, by and through James W. Phillips of The Roark Law 
Firm. his attomeys of record, filed a motion to augment the record on June 29(\ 2009. 
The motion was made pursuant to IRCP 84( 1) and requested the following 
documents be made part of the Agency Record: 
1. Preliminary plat initially submitted as pati of the application dated 6-20-08. 
2. Minutes of the March 9. 2009 meeting of the Camas County Board of 
Commissioners. 
Camas County had no objection to the motion. 
Based on the review by the Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
petitioner's Motion to Augment the Record is GRANTED. 
Dated this __ day of August. 2009. 
Robert J. Elgee 
District Judge 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This order comes on Stephen V. Jasso's and Curtis and Carnie Gorringe's petition 
for judicial review. The petitioners have taken issue with the Camas County Board of 
Commissioner's February 23, 2009 preliminary plat approval of a fourteen-lot 
subdivision. This issue is appealable pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6521 because it is 
conceded by Camas County that they have given the applicant in these proceedings 
permission to break ground. Deane Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916. I 
All parties submitted briefs and the court heard oral argument on August 19, 
2009. Camas County has been represented throughout by Moore Smith Buxton & 
Turcke, Chtd., Boise. Stephen V. Jasso has been represented throughout by James W. 
Phillips of the Roark Law Firm, Hailey. Curtis and Carnie Gorringe have been 
represented throughout by Benjamin W. Worst of Benjamin W. Worst, P.C, Ketchum. 
Camas County had a Motion to Augment the Record that was withdrawn at the hearing. 
In its briefs and at hearing, the petitioners set forth numerous allegations why it 
believed the county's approval of the subdivision application was in error. In brief, 
petitioners allege that the proposed subdivision includes a cul-de-sac on a road more than 
500 feet in length violating Camas County's Subdivision Ordinance; that approval 
converted a private access easement into a private road in violation ofthe Subdivision 
Ordinance; that the preliminary plat application fails to include significant mandatory 
information regarding the floodplain; and that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
1 A person who has "an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial 
of a permit authorizing the development" and who is "aggrieved by a decision" granting or denying the 
permit may seek judicial review, after exhausting all remedies under the county ordinance. Johnson 
quoting I.e. § 67-6521. The approval of an application for a subdivision constitutes a decision granting a 
permit. The granting of a permit authorizes the development and is therefore appealable, if it "places a 
developer in a position to take immediate steps to permanently alter the land." Johnson quoting Payette 
River Property Owners Ass 'n v. Board o/Comm 'rs o/Valley County, 132 Idaho 551,555,976 P.2d 477, 
481 (1999). An affected person means one "having an interest in real property which may be adversely 
affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing development." Johnson quoting I.e. § 67-
252I(1)(a). Jasso and Gorringes have real property which may be adversely affected by the approval of the 
Subdivision because their properties are located adjacent or almost adjacent to the proposed Subdivision, 
the single access road to the Subdivision is proposed through their property, and the Subdivision will 
increase the amount and character of traffic traveling through their property. Jasso and Gorringes are 
adversely affected by the decision of the Board in a manner different in kind and degree than the general 
public. 
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Law justifying the preliminary plat approval are wholly insufficient and fail to constitute 
the "reasoned statement" required by Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) 
On April 10, 2007 Patrick Dunn submitted a preliminary plat application to 
subdivide an approximately 80 acre parcel of property. (R., p. 83). On July 10,2007, 
Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission ("Commission") held a public hearing 
on the application, and on August 7, 2007 and September 4,2007, the Commission 
discussed the matter at its regular meetings. Dunn submitted a second preliminary plat 
application (the "Application") for the same subdivision on June 2, 2008 after Camas 
County adopted a new zoning ordinance (Camas County Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance). (R., p. 47). The application was for fifteen, six-acre lots. Fricke 
Creek runs through the property, and the Subdivision is accessed by a single street 
approximately 1 mile in length. A substantial portion of the mile long street is located 
within the private access easement from the Dunn property across the Jasso property and 
the Gorringe property to Baseline Road, a public street. (R., p. 236). At build out, the 
Subdivision will generate 150 vehicle trips per day. (R., p. 145). 
The Commission held a public hearing on the application on August 18, 2008, which 
the Petitioners attended. (R., p. 17, and R., p. 177). Petitioners objected to the 
application at the meeting and sent a letter to the Commission urging them not to approve 
the application for the same reasons set forth in their briefs and at hearing, listed above. 
CR., p. 209). On September 2, 2008, the Commission unanimously voted not to approve 
the application and made its recommendation to the Board of Camas County 
Commissioners ("Board"). (R., p.16). The recommendation, dated September 4, 2008, 
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was to deny the application due to "the quality of the easement and the road layout as per 
the subdivision ordinance and the possibility that it is a cul-de-sac." (R., p. 16). 
On September 22, 2008, the Board first considered the application. (R., p. 237). 
The Board did not hold a public hearing or take public comment with regard to the 
application. On January 12,2009, the Board entered its decision to have a hammerhead 
tum-around at the terminus of Fricke Creek Road. (R., p. 13). The Board also instructed 
the Commission to hold a public hearing for the purpose of reviewing the design of the 
hammerhead tum-around. (R., p. 242). 
On February 3, 2009, the Commission held a public hearing and recommended 
approval of the proposed design of the hammerhead. (R., pgs. 8, 10, and 11). Jasso and 
Gorringe appeared, via their attorneys, objecting to the Application for the same reasons 
previously stated. (R., p. 11). On February 23, 2009, the Board made its decision 
approving the application, and on March 6, 2009, the Board re-executed its decision 
form. (R., p. 4 and 5). On March 9, 2009, the Chairman of the Board signed the 
"Findings of facts and conclusions oflaw." (R., p. 1-3). 
Petitioners Jasso and Gorringe timely filed their Petitions for Judicial Review. 
The actions were consolidated and issues of law were bifurcated from issues of fact by 
Court Order dated May 4,2009. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of local 
land use decisions. Price v. Payette County Bd O/County Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 
429,958 P.3d 583, 586 (1998). The Idaho Supreme Court, in Evans v. Teton County, 139 
~to J 4 
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Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003), has clearly set forth the standard of review for judicial 
review of the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUP A) as follows: 
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected 
person to seek judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use 
application, as provided for in the Idaho Administrative Procedural Act 
(IDAP A). Idaho Code § 67-6521 (1)( d) (2002); Evans v. Bd of Comm 'rs 
of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 430, 50 P.2d 443, 445 (2002). The 
district court conducts judicial review of the actions of local government 
agencies. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1) (2002). For purposes of judicial review of 
LLUPA decision, a local agency making a land use decision, such as the 
Board of Commissioners, is treated as a government agency under 
IDAPA. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 
(2000). [Camas County (acting through the Planning and Zoning Board 
and the Board of Adjustment) is treated as an administrative agency for 
purpose of judicial review. Stevenson v. Blaine Co., 134 Idaho 756, 759, 9 
P.3d 1222, 1225 (2000).] The district court bases its judicial review on the 
record created before the local government agency. I.R.C.P. 84(e)(1). 
This Court reviews decisions under the IDAPA independently of any 
intermediate appellate court. Evans, 137 Idaho at 431, 50 P.3d at 446. 
The Court must affirm the Board of Commissioners unless it 
determines the Board of Commissioners' findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (1) violated the constitution or statutory 
provisions; (2) exceeded its statutory authority; (3) were made upon 
unlawful procedure; (4) were not supported by substantial evidence on the 
record; or (5) were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Id.; 
I.C. § 67-5279(3). There is a strong presumption that the actions of the 
Board of Commissioners, where it has interpreted and applied its own 
zoning ordinances, are valid. Evans, 137 Idaho at 431, 50 P.3d at 446; 
[Cowan v. Bd 0fComm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 
P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006)]. The party appealing the Board of 
Commissioners' decision must first show the Board of Commissioners 
erred in a manner specified under I.C. § 67-5279(3), and second, that a 
substantial right has been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279(4); Price v. Payette 
County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); 
[Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 1254]. 
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a statutory 
provision is a matter of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196,46 P.3d 
9, 13 (2002); Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 308, 17 P.3d 247, 252 
(2000). 
This Court defers to the Board of Commissioners' findings of fact 
unless the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. [I.C. § 67-5279(1 )]; 
Evans, 137 Idaho at 431,50 P.3d at 446; Friends' of Farm to A1arket, 137 
Idaho at 196, 46 P .3d at 13. The Board of Commissioners' factual findings 
~L,~ 
r- =SuA~~j~l K~u,~,w 
5 
are not clearly erroneous so long as they are supported by substantial. 
competent. although conflicting evidence. Friends of Farm to Market, 
137 Idaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13. 
Id. at 74-75, 75 P.3d at 87-88. 
Agency action is "capricious if it is done without a rational basis" and "arbitrary if 
it was done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate 
determining principles." American Lung Ass 'n, etc. v. State of Dep 't of Agriculture, 142 
Idaho 544,547, 130 P.3d 1082, 1085 (2006). If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall 
be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. I.e. 
§ 67-5279(3). 
ISSUES 
Petitioners Jasso and Curtis and Carnie Gorringe raise identical issues: 
1. Whether the proposed access road in the Subdivision constitutes a cul-de-sac 
street more than 500 feet in length in violation of Article IV, Section C.7 of the 
Subdivision Ordinance; 
2. Whether approval of the Subdivision creates an access road across the Jasso and 
Gorringe properties in violation of Article IV, Section C.9 of the Subdivision 
Ordinance or whether Camas County violated Article V, Section B.l of its own 
Subdivision ordinance by granting the developer approval to commence 
development of the property without access to a public street or road; 
3. Whether Mr. Dunn's application contained required information relating to flood 
plains; 
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4. Whether the County's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fail to satisfy the 
requirement for a "reasoned statement" as required by Idaho Code § 67-6535(b); 
5. Whether petitioners have suffered actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, 
not the mere possibility thereof, as required by Idaho Code § 67-6535(c); and 
6. Whether the County's approval of the preliminary plat application was without a 
reasonable basis in law or fact sufficient for an award of attorney fees to Jasso and 
Gorringe under Idaho Code § 12-117(1). 
ANALYSIS 
A. Does the proposed access road in the Subdivision constitutes a cul-de-sac street 
more than 500 feet in length in violation of Article IV, Section C.7 of the Subdivision 
Ordinance? 
Camas County Subdivision Ordinance 152, Article IV, Section C(7) states, "Cul-
de-sac streets shall not be more than five hundred (500) feet in length and shall terminate 
with an adequate tum-around having a minimum radius of seventy-five (75) feet for right 
of way." Section B of the Subdivision Ordinance, in pertinent part, states that a cul-de-
sac is "a street connected to another street at one end only and provided with a turn-
around space at its terminus." This ordinance is not ambiguous and the applicant's 
proposed street meets this definition, and is therefore required to be not more than 500 
feet. 
Camas County conceded at oral argument that the proposed road is approximately 
3,000 feet long. In its brief, Camas County asserts that while it is true that a cul-de-sac 
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cannot exceed five hundred feet, there are several other available dead-end access roads 
used in the County pursuant to the International Fire Code adopted by the County via 
Ordinance 160. The county further states that Article IV, Section C(3) specifically 
provides for Stub Streets where it is anticipated that future connectivity may be a viable 
option. The County asserts that under Camas County Ordinance 160, the County adopted 
Appendix D of the 2006 edition of the International Fire Code, which provides for an 
access road in the form of a Hammerhead design to be utilized in lieu of other dead-end 
streets including, a cul-de-sac road. Therefore, the County alleges the Petitioners' 
assertion is irrelevant because the street in dispute is an access road with a hammerhead 
and not a cul-de-sac at all. 
The International Fire Code was adopted under Ordinance 160, which was 
adopted after the filing of the Fricke Creek Subdivision application. It is well established 
that an applicant's rights are determined by the ordinance in existence at the time of filing 
of the application. Payette River Property Owner Ass 'n v. Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 
976 P.2d 477 (1999). The Fricke Creek application was filed on June 02, 2008, and 
Ordinance 160 was adopted on July 28, 2008. (R., p.47). Even if the Fire Code was 
applicable, it would not trump the Subdivision Ordinance. Appendix D of the Fire Code 
provides minimum design standard for cases where dead end streets are allowed. The 
Subdivision Ordinance clearly prohibits streets that are connected to another street at one 
end only, i.e., dead end streets. 
The particular configuration of the turnaround is of no relevance. The ordinance 
only specifies a minimum turning radius. As long as the applicant's terminus meets the 
minimum turning radius definition, the nature of the terminus is irrelevant. However, the 
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length restriction of the road means the county has violated its own statute by authorizing 
a road 6 times its maximum ordinance length. 
Moreover, the County made absolutely no findings or conclusions as to the length 
of the proposed road, or why it was acceptable. "Conclusion of Law" #6 states, "The 
subdivision is in compliance with the Comprehensive Plan, Zoning and Subdivision 
ordinances." (R., p. 2). This statement is in error on this point. The subdivision violates 
the county's provision regarding cul-de-sac street length. Idaho case law is clear that 
mere recitations of evidence and conclusory statements will not satisfy LLUPA's 
requirement for a "reasoned statement." Cowan v. Board ofComm 'rs of Fremont 
County, 143 Idaho 501, 503,148 P.3d 1247,1257 (2006); Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City 
of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 76, 156 P.3d 573,577 (2007). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5279(3)(a)-(e), the decision approving the 
application violates the County's own ordinance. As such, it is in excess of statutory 
authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and prejudiced substantial rights of the Petitioners. 
B. Did approval of the subdivision create an access road across the Jasso and 
Gorringe properties in violation of Article IV, Section C.9 of the Subdivision 
Ordinance, and did Camas County violate Article V, Section B.t of its own 
Subdivision Ordinance by granting the developer approval to commence 
development of the property without access to a public street or road? 
(l) The status of the easement. 
The Subdivision Ordinance, Article IV, Section C(9) states, "Private streets and 
roads shall be prohibited except within planned unit developments." Camas County 
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Ordinance No. 153, Article II, Section B defines private as a "street that is not accepted 
for public use or maintenance which provides vehicular and pedestrian access." This 
ordinance may be ambiguous as applied because it is unclear whether it means no private 
roads in subdivisions, or no private roads anywhere. For purposes of this discussion, the 
court will assume it means no private roads only in the subdivision. The issue, then, is 
that the only road leading from the subdivision to the next public access, which in this 
case is Baseline Road, is over (through) Jasso's and Gorringes' easement. 
The County agreed at oral argument that the Jasso/Gorringe easement is a private 
easement, but the County argues that Article V, Section (B)(1) permits "private roads, 
easements, etc." to access a Subdivision, the validity of which is a condition of final 
approval and the responsibility of the eventual property owner to ensure. According to 
Camas County, either the parties can obtain a declaratory judgment to determine their 
relative rights in and over the easement, or the county can look at the status of the 
easement, and whether the developer has obtained public access to a public road, at the 
time the building permits are sought, presumably by people who have acquired land in 
the subdivision and are ready to build. 
Article V, Section (B)(1) provides, "No platted subdivision of five (5) or more 
lots ... shall be developed without access to a public street or road." The plain language of 
the ordinance is clear and unambiguous on this point. According to the County, 
"development" of the subdivision would not occur until the proposed residents of the 
subdivision apply for building permits. This court rejects that argument and concludes 
that the county cannot make compliance with that section conditional and require 
compliance at some future time. Instead, the court concludes that the county must insure 
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compliance with the Subdivision Ordinance before the developer is ever given 
permission to break ground-a fact the County concedes has already occured. 
Jasso and Gorringes want the court to rule that the County has, at least impliedly, 
determined that the easement is "public" (or can be appropriated for an increase in use by 
the subdivision developer) because the County approved the development. They argue 
that the County has no authority to simply grant the developer, and therefore subdivision 
residents, increased access through their property. They submit that any such approval 
would greatly expand the scope of use of their private easement and/or would constitute a 
"taking" or appropriation of their private easement for a public purpose.2 They further 
suggest that this process would allow a private street in violation of the County 
Subdivision Ordinance. 
Camas County submits they have done no such thing. Instead, they argue that 
they have made no decision as to whether the developer has or does not have "access to a 
public street or road" and the County can therefore await subsequent developments to see 
if the developer is able to tum the easement into public access, and improve the road to 
meet County standards. The County argues they can review the status of the easement, 
and whether it constitutes "public access", at the time residents seek building permits. 
This court concludes that the County's own ordinance requires that Article V, Section 
(B)(l) requires the County to find and conclude, before the developer is given permission 
to break ground, based on evidence in the record, that the proposed subdivision has or 
does not have access to a public street or road. 
2 The court recognizes this issue is real. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty of 
litigation over the question whether increased use of an easement unreasonably increases the burden on the 
servient estate. Christensen v. City a/Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 135, 124 P.3d 1008, 1011. 
II 
The court concludes that the issue of whether the County has appropriated 
petitioner's easement, or whether the approval of this subdivision improperly increases 
the burden on petitioner's estates, or constitutes a taking, is not before the court. For 
reasons which appear below, those issues are not proper for the court to determine in this 
judicial review proceeding. 
(2) Findings and Conclusions Regarding the Easement 
Petitioners appeared at the public hearings held regarding the application and 
submitted letters to the County objecting to the application. The County Planning and 
Zoning Committee recommended disapproval of the application. On the 
Recommendation Form, dated September 4,2008, the chairman urged the Board to "pay 
attention to the quality of the easement and the road layout as per the subdivision 
ordinance and the possibility that it is a cul-de-sac." (R., p. 16). Finding of Fact No. 17, 
which states, "The Planning and Zoning Commission made a recommendation of 
approval to the Board of Commissioners," is plain error. (R., p. 2). 
The Board was aware of the easement issue and failed to make any conclusions 
regarding the matter. Instead, Conclusion of Law No.5 states, "A copy of the warranty 
deed and easement agreement are in the file." (R., p. 2) This is a statement of fact, or a 
finding of fact, not a conclusion of law. Either way, it is woefully inadequate as either a 
finding of fact or a conclusion of law to resolve what was necessary to resolve in this 
case-whether the development currently has or does not have access to a public street 
or road. 
A finding of fact is a determination of a fact by the court or agency, which fact is 
averred by one party and denied by the other and this determination must be founded on 
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the evidence in the case. CrOlvn Point Development, Inc, v. City (~fSun Valley, 144 Idaho 
72,77, 156 P.3d 573,578. The County must reach a conclusion, on a contested record, 
of whether there is currently access to a public street or road. It is not sufficient if the 
County avoids an issue which has been squarely raised. Only if the Board has reached a 
conclusion one way or the other could the court look to see if the evidence in the record is 
sufficient to support their conclusion. As it stands now, there are not sufficient findings 
or conclusions as to whether there was sufficient access to the subdivision. 
C. Did Mr. Dunn's application fail to include required information relating to flood 
plains? 
Mr. Dunn failed to provide information regarding the flood plain with his 
application. Supplying such information allows citizens to make informed arguments and 
objections when a public hearing is held on the proposed land use; citizens should not be 
forced to attend a public hearing to find out what a developer proposes to do. Johnson v. 
City o/Homedale, 118 Idaho 285, 287; 796 P.2d 162,164 (1990). Article VI, Section G 
of the Subdivision Ordinance states: 
For any proposed subdivision that is located within a flood plain, the 
developer shall provide the Commission with a development plan of 
adequate scale and supporting documentation that will show and explain at 
least the following: 
(a) Location of all planned improvements. 
(b) The location of the floodway and the floodway fringe per 
engineering practices as specified by the Army Corps of 
Engineers. 
(c) The location of the present water channel. 
(d) Any planned rerouting of waterways. 
(e) All major drainage ways. 
(f) Areas of frequent flooding. 
(g) Means of flood proofing buildings. 
;)16 
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13 
(h) Means of insuring loans for improvements within the flood 
plain. 
Article VI, Section H(2) states, "The developer shall prepare and submit an 
environmental impact statement along with the preliminary plat application for any 
development that is proposed within an area of critical concern." An area of critical 
concern is designated by the Board or by the State, and under Article VI, Section H(1), 
"special concern shall be given to any proposed development within an area of critical 
concern to assure that the development is necessary an desirable and in the public interest 
in view of the existing unique conditions." Flood plains are included under H( 1 ) as a 
hazardous or unique area that may be designated an area of critical concern. 
There is clear evidence that Fricke Creek flows through the subdivision, (R., p. 
202 and p. 236), and in a February 1,2008 letter addressed to Camas County Planning 
and Zoning, Idaho Department of Fish and Game stated that Fricke Creek can experience 
high flows during spring run-off events. (R., p. 140) Additionally, the issue was raised 
repeatedly by Petitioners via letters and objection in-person at hearings. There is no 
evidence that the subdivision is or is not actually in a flood plain, but it is clear the issue 
was raised before the agency, and it is an issue the County should have resolved one way 
or another. 
The Subdivision Ordinance requires that "for any proposed subdivision that is 
located within a flood plain, the developer shall provide the Commission with a 
development plan ... " that will show and explain the location of the floodway, etc per 
engineering practices as specified by the Army Corps of Engineers. The County contends 
because FEMA has not officially adopted a floodplain map for the area, the County 
cannot subject an applicant to the flood plain requirements. First, whether FEMA acts or 
14 
fails to act will not excuse the County from its self imposed duties. Second, whether 
FEMA has acted or failed to act is argument of counsel, not a finding that can be made 
upon any record. In order to excuse compliance with its own Subdivision Ordinance, the 
County would be required to find, based on adequate evidence, that the proposed 
development is or is not in a floodplain. If it is, the application process has certain 
requirements that must be met. If it is not in a floodplain the application requirements 
may be avoided. If the County does not know, that is another matter. In any event, the 
issue was raised at hearing by the petitioners, among others, and the County must make 
adequate findings and conclusions in this regard. Even if the applicant failed to provide 
this information with his application, the County failed to address it. The record is devoid 
of any findings or conclusions with regard to a floodplain. 
D. Do the County's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fail to satisfy the 
requirement for a "reasoned statement" as required by Idaho Code § 67-6535(b)? 
Under I.e. § 67-6535(b), approval or denial of a land use application must be in 
writing and "accompanied by a reasoned statement" explaining the relevant criteria and 
standards, the relevant contested facts relied upon, and the rationale for the decision 
based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and relevant ordinances." 
The Board's decision must be based on "standards and criteria" set forth in the 
"comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or regulation" of 
the county. I.C. § 67-6535(a). 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the adequacy of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law for purposes of judicial review. Crown Point Development. Inc. v. 
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City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 156 P.3d 573 (2007). While the court in its decision 
was addressing the provisions of I.e. § 67-5248(1 )(a), the reasoning has similar 
application to § 67-6535. When the Board made its decision to approve the subdivision 
application, its decision must be based on "standards and criteria" set forth in the 
comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or regulation" of 
the county; further, the approval or denial of the rezone change must be in writing and 
"accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered 
relevant, states the relevant contested facts, and explains the rationale for the decision .... " 
I.e. § 67-6535 (a)&(b). 
In Cowan v. Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247, the court observed 
that, "For 'effective judicial review of the quasi-judicial actions of zoning boards, there 
must be ... adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law.' Workman Family P 'ship v. 
City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 36, 655 P.2d 926, 930 (1982). Conclusory statements 
are not sufficient; instead '[w]hat is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear 
statement of what, specifically, the decision making body believes, after hearing and 
considering all of the evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon which its 
decision is based. '" ld at 37,655 P.2d at 931 (quoting S of Sunnyside Neighborhood 
League v. Bd OfComm 'rs, 280 Or. 3,21-22,569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 (1977)). 
The Camas County Board repeatedly failed to include reasoned statements of 
findings of facts and conclusions. As demonstrated in Section A, B, and C, the issues 
regarding the cul-de-sac, easement, and flood plain were all raised several times. In 
failing to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law in the face of clear 
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evidence and repeated arguments to the contrary, Camas County violated Jasso's and 
Gorringes' fundamental rights. 
E. Have petitioners have suffered actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, 
not the mere possibility thereof, as required by Idaho Code § 67-6535(c)? 
The petitioner has the burden of establishing that a substantial right is involved 
and that he has been prejudiced. Approving a subdivision which violates the Subdivision 
Ordinance is arbitrary and capricious and a violation of the Petitioners' constitutional due 
process rights. Constitutional due process requirements apply to quasi-judicial 
proceedings, such as the approval of subdivision applications. Procedural due process 
requires notice of the proceedings, specific written findings of fact, and an opportunity to 
be present and rebut evidence. Cooper v. Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 
(1980); I.C. § 67-6535. Due process requires that a decision not be arbitrary or 
capricious and not in violation of applicable ordinances. Substantial rights of the 
Petitioner have been prejudiced by the Board's action of approving the Subdivision 
which violates its own ordinance. Rural Kootenai Org. v. Kootenai County, 133 Idaho 
833, 992 P.2d 596 (1999); Payette River Property Owners Ass 'n v. Valley County, 132 
Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999). Where a decision violates such substantial rights of the 
Petitioner it must be vacated. Sanders Orchard v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P .3d 
488 (2002). 
The Camas County Board approved the subdivision application despite the 
application's clear violations of the Subdivision Ordinance. In addition, the Board failed 
to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Jasso and Gorringe have 
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established their substantial rights have been prejudiced by the Board's decision to 
approve the application. 
F. Was the County's approval of the preliminary plat application without a 
reasonable basis in law or fact sufficient for an award of attorney fees to Jasso and 
Gorringe under Idaho Code § 12-117(1)? 
All parties seek attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117(1) which provides: "[I]n 
any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency 
[or] a ... county, ... the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorneys fees, 
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the 
judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
The purpose of section 12-117 is to serve as a "deterrent to groundless or arhitrary 
agency action" and to "provide a remedy for persons who have been born unfair or 
unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to 
correct mistakes agencies should have never made." Bogner v. State Dep 't. of Rev. and 
Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984). Because of Camas County's 
failure to follow its own ordinance and its arbitrary and capricious behavior, Stephen 
Jasso and Curtis and Carnie Gorringe have born unfair financial burdens. 
In Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005), 
the Court found that the City of Ketchum wholly ignored the provision of its avalanche 
zone district ordinance requiring the certification by an Idaho licensed engineer 'prior to 
the granting of a conditional use permit. '" The Court determined that such disregard for 
its own ordinance amounted to failure to act with a reasonable basis in fact or law. Here, 
(j1~ 18 
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Camas County Board of Commissioners acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law 
when it ignored the provisions of its Subdivision Ordinance. 
Camas County decision to approve the subdivision application was not made in 
the reasoned manner required by Idaho Code § 67-6535. The Board acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously and deprived Jasso and Gorringes of their fundamental constitutional and 
statutory rights. Jasso and Gorringes have had to incur attorney fees to seek judicial 
review in order to enforce the Board to comply with the law. 
In as much as this court has determined that the action of the Board violated the 
due process rights of the petitioner, there was not competent and substantial evidence to 
support the decision of the Board, and the decision of the Board was arbitrary and 
capricious, the petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs attributable 
to the petition for judicial review only. Therefore, such attorney fees and cost shall be 
awarded to the petitioners pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
The decision of the Board of Commissioners of Camas County to approve the 
Frick Creek Subdivision is HEREBY VACATED, and the matter is remanded to the 
Board of Commissioners for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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STEPHEN V. JASSO! 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
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political subdivision of the 

















CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, 
husband and wife, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the 














Case Nos. CV-2009-14 
and CV-2009-1S 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
The Petitioner, Stephen V. Jasso, by and through its 
attorney of record, James W. Phillips of The Roark Law Firm, 
hereby submits this Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements and 
Attorney Fees pursuant to IRCP 54 (d) and (e), Idaho Code Section 
12-117, and other applicable rules and statutes. 
COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS 
Petition filing fee: 3/20/09 check # 7540 
Camas County 
Court Clerk $ 88.00 
Record copy fees: 3/20/09 check # 7541 120.00 
Camas County 
4/23/09 check #7562 20.00 
Camas County 
Total $ 228.00 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The petitioner respectfully requests attorney fees in the 
following amount, and submits that said- attorney fees are 
reasonable and based upon the time, labor and hourly rate set for 
in the Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees filed herewith, summarized as follows: 
ATTORNEY HOURS BILLING RATE TOTAL 
James W. Phillips 88.5 $ 235.00 $ 20,797.50 
The Petitioner is entitled to an award of said attorney fees 
pursuant Idaho Code Section 12-117 because the Petitioner is the 
prevailing party and the Respondent acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. 
f 11 b · h' D.~~ b 2009 Respect u y su m~tted t 1S ~ day of Octo er 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP 
by 
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I hereby certify that 
foregoing document by 
the following: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ the ~ day of October, 2009, I mailed the 
USPS, first class mail postage prepaid, to 
Mr. Paul Fitzer 
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucke, Chtd 
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
attorney for Camas County, Idaho 
Ben Worst 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum ID 83340 
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 3 
J_~ES W. PHILLIPS 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
Attorneys at Law 
409 N. Main St. 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
208/788-2427 
ISB # 1520 
Attorneys for petitioner 
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CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the ) 






CURTIS AND CAMIE GOR~IN:GE I ... ) 
husband and wife,) 
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CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a ) 
political subdivision of the ) 




STATE OF IDAHO 





Case Nos. CV-2009-14 
and CV-2009-15 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, being sworn upon oath, deposes and 
AFFIDAVIT - 1 
;. UUJ 
states as follows: 
1. I am the attorney for the Petitioer in the above 
entitled action, and I am an "of counsel" member of the Roark Law 
Firm. I am duly admitted to the practice of law in the state of 
Idaho. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the matters herein 
referred to and make this Affidavit in support of Petitioner 
Jasso's Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees in the above 
entitled action. I am competent to testify to the facts set 
forth herein if called upon to do so. 
3. The Petitioner is billed and pays the affiant at 
the affiant's customeary billing rate rate for legal services of 
two hundred thirty-five dollars ($235.00) per hour which lS 
comparable to the prevailing charges for similar work by 
attorneys of similar experience in this area. 
4. To establish the outstanding amount due and owing 
from a client, the affiant prepares daily time records, 
describing the particular legal services performed, together with 
the particular date such legal services were rendered, as well as 
designating the amount of time spent on the particular matter. 
The time slips are totaled, then multiplied by my hourly rate to 
arrive at a bill for legal services performed. Also added is the 
sum of any and all costs advanced through that particular date on 
behalf of the client. The bills are sent to the client on a 
monthly basis. 
5. I have performed the legal services for the 
Petitioner in connection with the above referenced matter 
AFFIDAVIT - 2 
rnA !'iV. LUU IUU -J01U ... UU"! 
described in Exhibit "A", attached hereto, and the petitioner has 
incurred the sum of $ 20,797.50 for attorneys fees herein and 
$228.00 for costs. That sum is reasonable given the nature of the 
action, the experience of the affiant, and the legal services 
rendered. 
6. I attest to my belief that the items of costs, 
disbursements, and attorney fees are correct and were necessarily 
incurred and reasonable for the services rendered in prosecution 
of this action, and are allowable under IRCP Rule 54(d) and (e), 
Idaho Code Section 12-117, and other applicable rules and 
statutes. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this q~ day of October, 2009 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this q -f.jq . day' ~f' 
October, 2009. 
~~\ k.a.J,n}O,A cJ.-o 
T~LIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at -b±CL(..I..~ 
Commission expires I-VZ-tl 
AFFIDAVIT - 3 
J.H~" HV, L.V~! IUU ..lulU 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the ~~ day of October, 2009, I mailed the 
foregoing document by USPS, first class postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Mr. Paul Fitzer 
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucke, Chtd 
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
attorney for ·Cruuas County, Idaho 
Ben Worst 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum ID 83340 
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe 
Dated: If) -- q .... ~1 
AFFIDAVIT - 4 
--
EXHIBIT "A" 
0AMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ. 
P.O. Box 864 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Mr. Steven Jasso 
20 Quigley Gulch Rd 
Hailey, ID 83333 
April 1, 2009 
Statement of Account 
Re: Camas County, Idaho 





travel to Fairfield and review Camas 
County ordinances, resolutions, affidavits 
of publication, and records re: Fricke 
Creek and subdivision ordinance adoption 
and amendment.s 
legal research re: appeal issues and 
requirements for adequate record 
legal research re: appeal issues/standing; 
draft outline of petition 
________ -'"'3!J/._l'-1 ..... LL..Ql.L-.I.9_--'w""o~r:..L>k____'_LoD_d;ca f t 0 -F Pe±.i.t.ion Eo r ,Ill d j cia J 





work on draft of Petition For Judicial 
Review; meeting with client 
work on draft of Petition For Judicial 
Review and legal research re: appeal 
issues 
edit draft of Petition For Judicial Review 















review after-the-fact findings and the 
issues raised thereby 2.6 
revise draft of Petition for Judical 
Review and legal research re: issues 
finalize Petition: t. conf. Rollie 
Bennett, Camas County Clerk; meeting 
with Mr Jasso; t. conf. Worst; travel 
to Fairfield to file Petition 














THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP 
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ. 
409 N. MAIN ST. 
HAILEY, IDAHO 83333 
Mr. Steve Jasso 
20 Quigley Gulch Rd 
Hailey, ID 83333 
May 1, 2009 
Statement of Account 
Re; Camas County, Idaho 









review Gorringes' General Statement of 
Issues; review Camas County Comprehensive 
P'4,gJ1 i;!.11g, n9t~S. oJ m~~tings and hearings 
re: Fricke Creek re: Gorringe/Jasso 
issues 2.1 
draft Motion to Consolidate Petitions For 
Judicial Review, Motion To Compel Filing 
of Record, and Motion to Bifurcate Legal 
Issues 1.0 
finalize Motion to Consolidate Petitions, 
Motion to Compel Filing of Record; and 
Motion to Bifurcate; letters to Judge Elgee, 
Fitzer, and Bennett .8 
t. conf. Ben Worst, attorney for Gorringes, 
re: motions and appeal issues .3 
t. cont. Fitzer re: motions; t. conf. 
Bennett re: record .2 
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review Record provided by County 2.7 
prepare for and attend hearing on County's 
Motion To Stay Proceedings, and on 
Motion to Consolidate and Motion To 
Bifurcate Legal Issues 
draft of proposed Order on Motions 
draft of Objections to Record; t. cont. 
Ben Worst re: problems with record and 
objections thereto 
finalize Objections to Record; t. conf. 
Ben Worst re: objections; letters to 
Judge Elgee, Fitzer, and Bennett 
Total Time: 




Record Fee . 
Previous Balance 
payments Received 













THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP 
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ. 
409 N. MAIN ST. 
HAILEY, IDAHO 83333 
:, I) j 
Mr. Steve Jasso 
20 Quigley Gulch Rd 
Hailey, ID 83333 
June 1 f 2009 
Statement of Account 
Re: Camas County, Idaho 






t. conf. Worst re: Record issues .2 
t. conf. Bennett re: status of record; 
review Dunn e-mailj t. conf. worst; 
review IRCP and court orders re: schedule; 
draft Motion To Compel .Settling_auct Lpd-
ging Of Record 1.7 
t. conf. worst, and finalize Motion to 
Compel Settling and Lodging Of Record With 
Court .8 
review County's Response to Motion to Compel 




draft Reply to County's Response 1.8 
review Exhibits to County's Response to 
Motion to Compel; revise Petitioner's 
Reply; t. conf. Worst; read decision in 
Martin v. Camas County 
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THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP 
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ. 
409 N. MAIN ST. 
ffAlLEY, IDAHO 83333 
Mr. Steve Jasso 
20 Quigley Gulcb Rd 
Hailey, ID 83333 
July 1, 2009 
Statement of Account 
Re: Camas County, Idaho 














attend hearing on Motion To Compel Settl-
ing And Lodging Record 
work on outline of Opening Brief 
review Rebord and le~al.research re: Brief 
work on draft of Brief 
work on draft of Brief; t. conf. Worst 
t. conf. Worst; work on draft of Brief; 
legal research 
work on draft of Brief; legal researcb 
work on draft of Brief; legal research 
work on draft of Brief 
legal research; edit draft Brief 
t. conf. Worst; revisions to Brief 
final revisions/edits to Brief; draft 
Motion to Augment 
Total Time: 
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THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP 
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ. 
409 N. MAIN ST. 
HAILEY, IDAHO 83333 
Mr. Steve Jasso 
20 Quigley Gulch Rd 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Au gu s t 1, 2 009 
Statement of Account 
Re: Camas County, Idaho 










review Respondent's Motion To Augment 
and draft Memo in Opposition, letter to 
Jill Holinka re: IFC Stipulation; letters 
to Bennett, Holinka, and Elgee; draft 
of Stipulation To Augment 
'review Resporident "s Response Brief I and' 
Brief re: IFC; begin work on Reply Brief 
work on Reply Brief 
work on Reply Brief. 
work on Reply Brief 
work on Reply Brief 
work on Reply Brief 
work on Reply Brief 
Total Time: 

















Amount Due $ 19,967.00 
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Mr. Steve Jasso 
20 Quigley Gulch Rd 
Hailey, 1D 83333 
September 1, 2009 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP 
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ. 
409 N. MAIN ST. 
RAILEY, IDAHO 83333 
Statement of Account 
Re: Camas County, Idaho 
Fricke Creek Subdivision 
Services 
*. U J. . .J 
Hours 
8/19/09 prepare, travel and attend hearing on 
Petition for Judical Review in Fairfield 4.5 
\ 
Total Time: 









Benjamin W. Worst. ISB#5639 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C. 
371-A Walnut Avenue North 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone: (208) 622-6699 
Facsimile: (208) 726-8116 
benworst@cox.net 
Attorney for Petitioners Curtis and Camie Goninge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
STEPHEN V. JASSO, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, 
















CURTIS AND CAMJE GORRlNGE, husband ) 
and wife, ) 
Petitioners, 
v. 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, 













Case No. CV 2009-14 
Case No. CV-2009-15 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
COME NOW Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe, husband and wife ("Gorringes"), by 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS- I 
~9£l 
and drrough Benjamin W. Worst of the law finn Benjamin W. Worst, P.C., their attorney of 
record, and submit this Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to IRCP 54 (d) and 
(e), IAR 40 & 41, Idaho Code Section 12-117, and other applicable rules and statutes. 
The Gorringes respectfully request attorney fees in the following amount, and submit that 
said attorney fees are reasonable and based upon the time, labor and hourly rate set forth in the 
Affidavit of Benjamin W. Worst in Support of Memorandwn of Attorney Fees and Costs filed 
herewith, summarized as follows: 
Attorney 





The Gorringes respectfully request costs as a matter of right as set forth in the Affidavit of 
Benjamin W. Worst in Support ofMemorandwn of Attorney Fees and Costs filed herewith, 
summarized as follows: 
Filing Fee: 





The Gorringes are entitled to an award of said attorney fees pursuant Idaho Code Section 
12 -117 because they are the prevailing party and the Respondent acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law. 
DATED this ;Xday of a lk ,2009. 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.c. 
Attorney At Law 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS- 2 
;)Cffp 
ltl- ..1.,,)- flJ...J .l£.. . .u":t l,' 'uVl J .LJCUJCUIJ..L1J IAI Ul ..;) '- I .1 • V, L..UV I t........ .........&....&.'-' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 day of aij..J ,2009, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MEM()""RANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS to be served by the method indicated below. and addressed to the following: 
Mr. Paul Fitzer. Esq. 
Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turke 
950 West Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
James W. Phillips 
The Roark Law Firm 
409 N. Main St. 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
p4'Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
( ) U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
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Attorney At Law 
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State ofIdaho ) 
) 88 
County of Blaine ) 
I, BENJAMIN W. WORST, being duly swom upon oath, depose and state: 
1. I am the cOWlsel of record for Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe (the 
"Gorringes") in the above-entitled action and arn the President of the law fum Benjamin W. 
Worst, P.C. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and am competent 
to testify thereto if called upon to do so. 
3. I am duly admitted to the practice oflaw in Idaho and maintain an office at 
371-A Walnut Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340. 
4. I make this affidavit pursuant to IRCP Rules 54( d) & 54( e), IAR Rules 40 
& 41, Idaho Code § 12-117 and other applicable rules and statutes in support of the Goninges' 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. 
5. On or about February 1,2009, the Gorringes retained this law firm to 
represent them in this action. 
6. The Order Upon Hearing for Judicial Review in this action dated October 
2,2009, states that, ''the petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs attributable 
to the petition for judicial review only." 
7. Although I began working for the Goninges in the administrative phase of 
this matter on or about February 1.2009, I did not begin work directly attributable to the petition 
for judicial review until approximately March 2. 2009. 
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8. To establish the outstanding amount due and owing from a client, this law 
finn prepares time slips describing the particular legal services performed. together with the 
particular date such legal services were rendered, as well as designating the amount of time spent 
on the particular matter. The time slips are filed electronically for each client and on a periodic 
basis; the time is totaled, then multiplied by the applicable hourly rate to arrive at a bill for legal 
services perfonned as well as costs incurred. 
9. True and correct copies of the Gorringes' billing swmnaries showing the 
date, hours, amount and description of work performed are attached hereto as Exhibit A, and are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
10. Since March 2.2009. the date upon which I began work directly 
attributable to the petition for judicial review,the Gorringes have incurred attorney fees in the 
sum of $16,580.00 (SIXTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY DOLLARS). 
11. The sum of$16,580.00 claimed for attorney fees is a reasonable sum, 
actually and necessarily incurred as provided below. 
12. The costs by right include $88.00 for the filing fee in this action and 
$120.00 paid to the County Clerk for the administrative record. 
13. The hours that I worked for the Gorringes and the hourly rate and the fees 
and costs charged to the Gorringes are as follows: 
Attorney 
Benjamin W. Worst 
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14. The legal services that I perfonned for the Gorringes included: 
a) Numerous telephone and in-person conferences with the client; 
b) Correspondence and telephone conferences with the attorneys for 
the Respondent, the attorney for Petitioner Jasso, the Clerk of the 
Court and the pennit holder, Patrick Dunn. 
c) Legal research, review of statutes, review of caselaw and review of 
the administrative record and documents. 
d) Preparation of pleadings and motions including without limitation 
the Petition for Judicial Review, the Statement of Issues, 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Augment, Objection to 
Record, Trial Brief and Rebuttal Brief. 
e) Preparation for and personal appearances at two hearings in Hailey, 
Idaho and one hearing in Fairfield. Idaho. 
15. The time and labor that I spent performing the legal services on behalf of 
the Gorringes are set forth in Exhibit A, attached hereto. This case was novel in that it never 
should have happened. Throughout the administrative phase of this matter, the Gorringes and 
other neighbors repeatedly raised the same issues and arguments raised in the petition for judicial 
review; however, Camas County ignored them. The skill required to successfully pursue a 
judicial review action under IRCP 84 is substantial. An attorney bringing such an action must 
understand the procedural complexities ofIRCP 84, the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, 
the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act and land use and development. I obtained this skill 
through working full-time as a statutory city attorney for more than four years and through twelve 
years of practicing in the field of land use and real estate law. I am not personally aware of any 
attorneys who pursue land use-related petitions for judicial review for less than $200 per hour 
and I am aware of several who charge more than $300 per hour. I performed the services on a 
contingent fee basis because my clients have very limited financial resources. The time 
limitations involved in a petition for judicial review are significant because IRep 84 imposes a 
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28 day statute of limitations. Due to such constraint, I was forced to push other projects back in 
order to complete the substantial amount of legal work required to file the petition on time. 
There was no claim for monetary damages in this case; however, the result obtained is excellent. 
My professional relationship with the Gorringes began on or about February 1,2009 and has 
been limited exclusively to this matter. I am not aware ofllie awards in similar cases; however, I 
can state that I performed tins work as efficiently as possible using Casemaker for automated 
research in lieu of Westlaw and relying upon Jim Phillips, counsel for Petitioner Jasso, to share 
his research, documents and specific knowledge of the record and applicable ordinances which 
he obtained by traveling to Fairfield, Idaho. It is my opinion that the attorney fees charged in this 
action have been fair, reasonable and necessarily incurred to obtain the Order, and each of the 
factors set forth in I.R. c.P. 54( e )(3) weigh in favor of an award of attorney fees by the Court in 
the sum of $16,580.00 (SIXTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY DOLLARS), and 
costs as a matter of right in the amount of $208.00 (TWO HUNDRED EIGHT DOLLARS). 
FURTIIER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH N 
(;s 
. fI.4 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this t h day of October, 2009. 
:-fr~ , 
No~ Public fhdahOv ..t t{ . 
Res1dmg at2'.lA .. j!.!"17 
My conunission expires 1(.' '- 2-,1- I s=: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this lJ.,.~day of a:-LV .2009, I caused a 
true and COlTect copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN W. WORST IN 
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS to be served by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Mr. Paul Fitzer, Esq. 
Moore~ Smith. Buxton & Turke 
950 West Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
James W. Phillips 
The Roark Law Finn 
409 N. Main St. 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail o Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(iFacsimile: (208) 788-3918 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C. 
Attorney At Law 
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BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C. 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Curtis & Connie Gorringe 
RR #1; Box 1177 
Fairfield ID 83327 
Professional Services 
31212009 Telephone conference with Gorringe and Konrad regarding description of judicial 
review 
3/11/2009 Telephone conference with counsel (2x) for Jasso 
3/1212009 Telephone conference with client 
3/13/2009 Telephone conference with client 
3/1712009 Telephone conference with client; telephone conference with counsel for Jasso 
311812009 Telephone conference with client; telephone conference with counsel for Jasso 
3120/2009 Telephone conference with counsel for Jasso; review Jasso Petition; review Rule 84; 
review LLUPA and IDAPA; telephone conference with client; telephone conference 
with neighbors; draft Petition for Judicial Review; draft Notice of Petition; arrange for 
service and filing 
3/3112009 Review file for statement of issues; begin statement of issues 
4/1/2009 Complete review of file and law; draft Statement of Issues 
41212009 Review Rule 84; telephone conference with Dunn; draft Acceptance of service and 
correspondence to Dunn; complete Statement of Issues; telephone conference with 
Clerk of the Court, correspondence to Clerk of the Court 
413/2009 Telephone conference with counsel Jasso regarding consolidation and Motion to 
Compel; draft corresponodence to client . 'fir ~. 11 

























4/8/2009 Review Jasso Motion to bifurcate; Motion to Consolidate and Motion to Compel; email 
to counsel for Jasso; telephone conference with client regarding representation 
4/10/2009 Telephone conference with and email to Dunn regarding Acceptance of Service; draft 
consent to consolidation; review Idaho Appellate Rules 
4/13/2009 Telephone conference with counsel for Jasso regarding consolidation and 
bifurcation; review Jasso motions; draft consent to bifurcation; review Rule 84 
regarding lodging of overdue record; correspondence to Camas County Clerk 
regarding lodging of record 
4/15/2009 Telephone conference with client; telephone conference with counsel for Jasso 
regarding Motions from opposing counsel; review Motions from opposing counsel; 
review 07-6510; telephone conference with Clerk of Camas County regarding record 
4/20/2009 Legal research regarding stay of judicial review vs tolling of application under 
67-6510; prepare for hearing on Motion to Stay; attend hearing on Motion to Stay, 
Bifurcate Issues of Law, consolidate cases and compel preparation of offical record 
4/2212009 Review Orders regarding' consolidation, bifurcation and stay; review record; prepare 
objections to record 
4/23/2009 Complete objection to Record; review Jasso objections; review service upon Dunn; 
telephone conference with Dunn; correspondence to Clerk of the Court; draft Proof of 
Service for Dunn 
5/512009 Review Order regarding Petition; draft correspondence to Camas County CierI< 
regarding overdue filing of record; review Rule 84 regarding overdue record 
5/12/2009 Review email from Dunn and respond to Dunn 
5/13/2009 Telephone conference with counsel for Jasso regarding settlement offers and 
Motions to Compel; telephone conference with client; email to Dunn 
5/18/2009 Telephone conference with counsel for Jasso regarding Motion to Compel; review 
Motion to Compel 
5/22/2009 Review Motion to Compel, setting of record and response to Motion to Compel; 
review case law regarding record 
5/27/2009 Review pleadings from counsel for Jasso and telephone conference with email client 
5/29/2009 Review Jasso Reply and telephone conference with counsel for Jasso 
6/812009 Prepare for hearing on Motion to Compel and settle recording; review Notice of 
Hearing; attend hearing on Motions 
6/15/2009 Review Affidavit of Butlin; confirm dates of application and publication of adVance 
legal research regarding trial brief; begin draft of brief 
6116/2009 Draft Trial Brief 
6117/2009 Draft Trial Brief 
6/19/2009 Legal research; draft brief 
\ 





















612212009 Legal research regarding remedies 
612312009 Legal research; draft trial brief 
612412009 legal research; draft trial brief 
612512009 Revise trial brief 
6/2912009 Finalize Brief in support of petition for judicial review 
7/1612009 Telephone conference with counsel for Jasso regarding Motion to Augment; 
telephone conference and email to opposing counsel regarding did not receive 
pleadings . 
7/1712009 Draft Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Augment; review Rule B4 and Order; 
review Motion to Augment and But/in Affidavit; correspondence to opposing counsel 
712512009 Review Affidavit of Butling, second Affidavit and Response to Objection; review 
County's Response to Trial Brief; draft Rebuttal Brief; Response to Opposition; draft 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Argument 
712612009 Review Jasso Rebuttal Brief; complete Gorringe Rebuttal Brief; legal research 
regarding remedies 
8/1712009 Prepare for oral argument; telephone conference with counsel for Jasso 
811812009 Prepare hearing; review briefs 
8/1912009 Final preparations for hearings; attend hearing in Fairfield 
























Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE. CHID. 
950 W. Bannock St.. Suite 520 
Boise. ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
Attorneysfi>r Re!J]Jondent Camas County 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 






CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political ) 




CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, ) 






CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO, a political ) 
subdivision of the State of Idaho. ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Consolidated Case Nos. 
CV-2009-14 & CV-2009-15 
RESPONDENT CAMAS COUNTY'S 
MOTION TO DISALLOW 
PETITIONERS' COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
COME NOW Respondent Camas County and objects to Petitioners Stephen V. Jasso and 
Curtis and Camie Gorringe's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(6) and 54(e)(6) Respondent moves this Court to disallo\v such costs and attorney fees for the 
reasons to be fully set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to DisallO\v 
RESPONDENT CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PETITIONERS CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE - I 
~3o'l 
Costs and Attomeys Fees filed concurrently herewith. Oral argument is not requested on this 
motion. 
Dated this 11,...day of October, 2009. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE. 
CHARTERED 
BY: __ -llJ-I--I-_-:::::-"--=== 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 'l '?day of October, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Benjamin W. Worst 
BENJAMIN W. WORST. P.c. 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
James W. Phillips 
Roark Law Firm, LLP 
409 North Main Street 
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Paul Fitzer. ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE. CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise. ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
Attorneys/hr Respondent Camas County 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 






CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political ) 




CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, ) 






CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political ) 
subdivision of the State ofIdaho. ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Consolidated Case Nos. 
CV-2009-14 & CV-2009-15 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT CAMAS COUNTY'S 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(6) and 54(e)(6) the County objects to attorney fees and costs 
identified in Petitioners' fees and costs memorandums and affidavits. Petitioners' claims for costs 
should be disallowed and its claim for attorney's fees should be denied or reduced for the following 
reasons: 
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II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
A. ATTORNEY FEES 
Petitioners' claims for attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-117 are excessive. 
duplicative, unreasonable and not limited to only those costs and fees attributable to the petition for 
review. The fees requested are extraordinarily excessive given the time and labor required and the 
lack of novelty and difficulty in interpreting subdivision code provisions. Petitioners seeks fees 
totaling 171 hours and $37,604.50 in fees. This is more than a month of full time work dedicated to 
this case alone. 
In particular, the Petitioners seek an excessive amount for merely contacting each other or 
reviewing each others work product I . More importantly, even a cursory review aptly demonstrates 
that much of each attorney's work product is nearly identical to the other, which combined with this 
excessive "review" of each other's work product, demonstrates that one or both Petitioners merely 
duplicated the other's work product. Not only are the amounts excessive, unreasonable, and even 
inconsistent with one another. the work product is simply duplicative. The fees based upon 
communication between the attorneys and reviewing each other's work product should be reduced to 
zero. Fees based upon work product should be reduced by fifty percent. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 a court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party only 
where the court finds that the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
"A party is not entitled to attorney fees if the issue is one offirst impression in Idaho .... Attorney's 
fees are also inappropriate if the City presented a legitimate question for this Court to address." Lane 
Ranch Partnership r. Cit)' (~lSlln Valley. 145 Idaho 87. 91. 175 P.3d 776. 780 (2007): See also 
Kootenai Afedica/ Or. 1'. Bonner COllnty. 141 Idaho 7.10.105 P.3d 667. 670 (2004). If the answer 
I See Worst Affidavit: 311. 3'17. 3'18. 3/20. 43, 4 i 8. 4il3. 415. 5/13. 518.5127.5'29. 7 i 16. 7126. 8i27: See 
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"was by no means obvious" attorney fees are inappropriate. A'aylor Farms t·. Latah County, 144 
Idaho 806, 810, 172 P.3d 108 L 1085 (2007). "Where an agency acts without authority, it is acting 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law". Id.; Magic Valley Sand & Gravel. 140 Idaho at 120, 90 
P.3d at 345. "However, if an agency's actions are based upon a 'reasonable, but erroneous 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute,' then attorney fees should not be awarded." Id. citing Russet 
Valley Produce, Inc. Idaho Potato Comm 'n v. Russet Valley Produce, Inc., 127 Idaho 654, 661,904 
P.3d566, 573 (1995); Coxv. Dep't. o.fIns .. Stateo.fJdaho, 121 Idaho 143, 148,823 P.2d 177, 182 
(CLApp. 1991). 
Attorney fees are further not appropriate unless all defenses and claims were asserted 
frivolously or without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Turbo W Cor pac, Inc. 119 Idaho 626, 
809 P.2d 487 (1991). Where some of the claims or issues are subject to argument, attorney fees 
are inappropriate. The County had a reasonable basis in fact or law to defend itself in this cause 
of action based upon, but not limited to, the following: 
1. Cul-De-Sac vs. Access Road. The Court concluded that the applicant's (Patrick Dunn) 
subdivision application did not comply with the County's Article IV. Section C(7) prohibiting cul-
de-sac streets over 500 feet in length. However, the County had a reasonable basis in fact or law to 
defend its position that there are alternatives to a cul-de-sac available within the County. The County 
has the authority to approve a dead-end access road including, but not limited to, Stub streets where 
it is anticipated. like here. that future connectivity may be a viable option. (A11icle IV. Section C(3». 
2. The Access is not required to be a Public Road. The Petitioner asserted that that the 
applicant's subdivision does not comply with Article IV. Section C(9) which prohibits private roads 
Phillips Affidavit: Jl17. 4~. 413. 4115. 4'22. 4'n. 5/5. 5 11.5/18.6 115.6/16.6'14. 
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except within Planned Unit Developments. The Court admittedly provided that this ordinance "may 
be ambiguous as applied because it is unclear whether it means no private roads in subdivisions, or 
no private roads anywhere:' Ifit is ambiguous2 then the County has a reasonable basis in fact and 
law to defend the Petitioner's assertions that Article IV. Section C(9) of Camas County's 
Subdivision Ordinance pertains not only to the "Design Standards" within a subdivision, but to all 
roads including access roads. While the County can of course require all roads within a proposed 
subdivision to be dedicated to the public, it could not require an applicant to dedicate property not 
his own and outside of his subdivision to the public as well. The Court sided with the County on this 
issue and as such the County did not proceed without a reasonable basis in fact and law. (Attorney 
fees are further not appropriate unless all defenses and claims were asserted frivolously or without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Turbo W Cor pac, Inc. 119 Idaho 626, 809 P.2d 487 (1991 )). 
3. Adjudication of an Easement is beyond the authority of the County 
The County acted with a reasonable basis in fact and law by requiring the Applicant to 
comply with Article V, Section B( 1) which requires that a proposed subdivision have access to a 
public road; i.e. a landlocked subdivision is precluded. The Board did so specifically requiring that 
the Subdivision must have access to Baseline Road as a condition of approval before building 
permits. certificates of occupancy, etc could be issued. 
The County reasonably refuted Petitioners' assertion that the County is in fact required to 
adjudicate the nature of the easement helore granting preliminary plat approval or simply deny the 
land use application on the basis of a neighbor's objection. The County does not possess the legal 
1 '"However. if an agency's actions are based upon a ·reasonable. but erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute.' then attorney fees should not be awarded." Emphasis added !d. citing Russ('l I 'a/fcl' ProdIIL·c. Inc. Idaho 
Potato COIllIl1 'nl', Russct "a/fcy Producc. Inc .. 117 Idaho 654,661. 904 P.3d 566. 573 (1995); 
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authority to provide a legal interpretation of such easement as such would be an ultra-vires act. 
"Where an agency acts without authority, it is acting without a reasonable basis in fact or lav,:"'.Id.; 
/v1agic Valley Sand & Gravel. 140 Idaho at 120,90 P.3d at 345. 
More importantly, the applicant asserts that the easement is public in nature; that the 
applicant and all future assigns have use of the road. Coupled with the easement itself, the applicant 
asserted that on its face, the easement does not indicate that it is private in nature. There also does 
not appear to have any limiting language within its terms. Thus, the County did not have grounds to 
deny the application merely because the neighbors contest that the easement is private in nature. 
Perhaps the neighbor is correct. Should the neighbors seek declaratory relief that the 
easement is private, then the applicant has not complied with the County's condition of approval. 
The applicant is on notice that this could be an issue. If the applicant chooses to proceed with its 
project, it does so at its own risk. But this does not enable nor require the County to summarily deny 
an otherwise valid application by virtue of a neighbor's interpretation of an easement. The County 
cannot unreasonably restrict an individual's property rights merely because a neighbor offers an 
alternative interpretation of an admittedly vague easement. The County is simply not vested with the 
authority to adjudicate this dispute. Until clear evidence is shown that the easement is private in 
nature, i.e. adjudication by a Court, the County will not unreasonably restrict private property where 
an easement is not plainly invalid on its face. 
The C0U11 mirrors this analysis. The easement is part of the official record and thus before 
the C0U11 too. The Court recognized the "difficulty oflitigation over the question whether increased 
use of an easement unreasonably increases the burden on a servient estate". The Court concluded 
that the issue \'\'as not before the Court nor proper in a judicial revie\v proceeding. If it is not proper 
in ajudicial revie\v proceeding, the County has a reasonable basis in fact and law that it is not proper 
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at the administrative level. 
4. Flood Plain: The Plaintiff contended that the subdivision does not comply with Article VI, 
Section H which requires that "any proposed subdivision that is located within a floodplain" is 
thereafter subject to the myriad of additional floodplain requirements. The County reasonably 
determined that this particular code provision is not applicable and in fact need not be addressed at 
all because FEMA has not, as yet, adopted a floodplain map for this area. As such, there is no 
evidence in the record nor could there be that this subdivision is located in the floodplain. The 
County acts with a reasonable basis in fact and law in not requiring the applicant to go to the 
considerable expense of providing floodplain studies, environmental impact statements, and other 
such information nor addressing the absence of it as the ordinance provision is simply not as yet 
applicable. The limit to the County's authority at this juncture is as provided in the approved plat 
which identifies the location of Fricke Creek and specifies that building envelopes must be at least 
200' from the creek. Further, there is no showing that the Petitioners have suffered any harnl by 
virtue of the absence of such environmental studies. 
5. Peculiarized Harm: The County had a reasonable basis in fact or law to assert that the 
Petitioners have not suffered harm by virtue of an alleged governmental error. Petitioners must 
demonstrate that its personal and substantial rights have been violated by virtue of the governmental 
conduct. The only arguable issue that might cause peculiarized hann to the Petitioners is the nature 
of the easement which. as stated. is not within the prevue of the County'sjurisdiction. Should it be 
determined by a court of law that the easement in question is private in nature. then the Applicant 
will not have complied with the conditions of approval of the County Board. 
6. Findings of Fact Conclusions of Layv: Petitioners both objected to the Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law dated March 3, 2009 as it purportedly was signed after February 23. 2009; the 
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date the Board of Commissioners allegedly entered their decision. The County had a reasonable 
basis in fact and law to defend itself and its findings as part of the record on the basis that the 
findings are routinely approved and therefore final at the following meeting: not the date of the 
hearing. 
The County had a reasonable basis in fact and law to substantively defend the Findings. The 
findings need not be a resuscitation of the entirety of the Subdivision Code but merely a reasoned 
statement pertaining only to the applicable provisions. The County specifically addressed the 
hammerhead dead-end street as acceptable if developed to county specifications and approved by the 
Road and Bridge Department. Where an easement is purported to access a public road for the benefit 
of the applicant's property, and there is no clear evidence to the contrary on the face of the easement 
the County acts with a reasonable basis in fact and law to refuse to adjudicate the nature of an 
easement or deny an application solely on the basis of testimony from a neighbor. The County can 
reasonably conclude that the easement must comply with the applicable code provisions providing 
the subdivision access to a public road and should the neighbor contest the nature of the easement via 
declarative judgment action and prevaiL the applicant bears this risk. 
7. Denial of a Written Transcribable Record: As to Floodplain requirements that are 
inapplicable to the proposed development and provisions pertaining to cul-de-sacs, findings offact 
need not address inapplicable code provisions. The County had a reasonable basis in fact and law to 
request a transcript of the record. The Court in denying the County's request for a transcribable 
record precluded the County from presenting evidence that it did in fact consider such issues in 
dispute such as the cul-de-sac and floodplain as ancillary and inapplicable issues which need not be 
addressed in the findings. These were the "criteria and standards it considered relevant. ... [with] 
detailed facts, and ... rational for its decision:'. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISALLOW 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PETITIONERS CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE - 7 
315 
B. BILL OF COSTS 
Respondent requests that Petitioners be awarded only those costs associated with the petition 
for judicial review as stated in the Order Upon Hearing for Judicial Revie\v entered on October 2nd• 
2009. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons. the County requests that attorney fees and costs be denied. 
Dated this '2. 'lctay of October. 2009. 
HARTERED 
By:_----,f.-6L~"'____,'--_==----
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thet--2...day of October. 2009. I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES by the method indicated below. and addressed to the following: 
Benjamin W. Worst 
BENJAMIN W. WORST. P.C. 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum. Idaho 83340 
James W. Phillips 
Roark Law Firm. LLP 
409 North Main Street 
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V U4:4t fM ~UA~K LAW tl~M 
JAMES W. PHILLIPS 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM 
Attorneys at Law 
409 N. Main St. 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
208/788-2427 
ISB # 1520 
Attorneys for petitioner 
:-, UUL 
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CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, ) 
a political subdivision of the ) 






CURTIS. AND CAMIE GORRINGE, 
husband and wife, 
petitioners, 
vs. 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a 
political subdivision of the 

















Case Nos. CV-2009-14 
and CV-2009-15 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW PETITIONERS' 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
COMES NOW, Stephen V. Jasso, the above-named Petitioner, 
by and through James W. Phillips of Tr1e Roark Law Firm, his 
attorneys of record, and requests the court set a hearing on the 
Respondent Camas County' 5 Motion To Disallo\v Petitioners' Costs and 
L'10TION FOR HEARING ON RESPONDENT I S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
Attorney Pees. This motion is made pursuant to Rule 54(e)(7) IRCP 
and on the grounds { in part, that Memorandum In Support of 
Respondent Camas County's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney 
Fees is inaccurate and misleading, and that amount of costs and 
attorney fees set forth in the Petitioner Jasso'S Memorandum of 
Cost and Attorney Fees and supporting affidavit are proper "and 
should be awarded. ~ 
DATED this ~&-~ay 
MOTION FOR HEARING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
31'6 
,", 1 / i..:' !.. '. j / \) 1: L' U'±. '± C [JVj 1\UM1\~ LtWV r 11\j'j fIlA HV. LU\) I!J\) J01U , . lJU '! 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Z-~ay of October I 2009 I I mailed 
the foregoing document by USPS first class postage prepaid to the 
following: 
Mr. Paul Fitzer 
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucke, Chtd 
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
attorney for Camas County, Idaho 
Ben Worst 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum ID 83340 
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe 
"-
Dated: ttl· 2. T .~Ott JaQ4JMp?v2 Q~ ~ 
attorney for Petitioner J SSo 
MOTION FOR HEARING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 3 
PAUL FITZER, ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
~Ll ~ I . :!:;:::!r-~-~_--'_! 
j. 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 ~Oei! 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant Camas County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
STEPHEN V. JASSO, 
P eti tioner -Respondent, 
Vs. 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 


















CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 












Consolidated Case Nos. 
CV-2009-14 & CV-2009-15 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, STEPHEN V. JASSO and his attorney, 
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, THE ROARK LAW FIRM, 409 N. MAIN STREET, HAILEY, IDAHO, 
83333, and RESPONDENTS CURTIS and CAMIE GORRINGE and their attorney, BENJAMIN W. 
WORST, BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C., P.O. BOX 6962, KETCHUM, IDAHO, 83340, ANDTHE 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
3~O 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Camas County, Idaho, appeal against the above-named 
Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment certified pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) 
entitled Order Upon Hearing for Judicial Review entered in the above-entitled action on the 2nd day of 
October, 2009, Honorable Judge Robert J. Elgee presiding. 
2. The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and 
order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable judgment and order under and pursuant to Rule 
11(a)(l),I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant now intends to 
assert in the appeal is as follows: 
(a) Whether the District Court, before the Honorable Robert Elgee, erred in ruling 
that provisions of the International Fire Code were not applicable in Camas County and that the 
Camas County Subdivision Ordinance "trumps" the International Fire Code. 
(b) Whether the District Court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the 
County Board in determining that the proposed access road in the Subdivision constituted a "cul-de-
sac" as opposed to other "dead end" streets including stub streets, hammerheads, etc. 
(c) Whether the District Court erred in determining that the County is vested with 
the authority and required to provide a legal interpretation of an easement between two private parties 
over property not the subject of the subdivision application. 
(d) Whether the District Court erred in determining that information pertaining to 
flood plains were required. 
(e) Whether the District Court erred in bifurcating issues of fact and law denying 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
3:A1 
the County's request for a transcribeable record which would have provided evidence of disputed 
questions of fact and issues oflaw. 
(f) Whether the District Court erred in holding that the County's decision 
approving the application violates Camas County's own ordinance; 
(g) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County did not comply with 
the statutory requirements pursuant Idaho Code §67-6535. 
(h) Whether the District Court erred in finding that Petitioners' substantial rights 
were prejudiced by virtue of the challenged conduct. 
(i) Whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding that Respondent is 
entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-117. 
(j) Whether Appellant is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under 
Idaho Code § 12-117. 
4. No order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests the preparation of the 
following portions of the reporter's transcript: the reporter's standard transcript pursuant to Rule 25, 
Idaho Appellate Rules supplemented by the following: 
(a) April 20th, 2009, hearing 
(b) June 8th, 2009, hearing (held in Blaine County), and 
(c) August 19th, 2009, hearing. 
6. Appellant requests that those documents which are automatically included under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 28 be included in the clerk's record. Appellant also requests the following documents 
be included in the clerk's record: 
(a) 03/20/2009 Appeal or Petition for Judicial Review; 





03/27/2009 - Order Re: Petition for Judicial Review Pursuant to I.R.c.P. 84; 
04/03/2009 Record of Proceedings; 
0411 0/2009 - Motion to Consolidate Petitions for Judicial Review; 






0411 0/2009 Motion to Bifurcate Issue of Law; 
0411 0/2009 Statement of Issues; 
04114/2009 - Notice of Filing of Agency Record; 
0411412009 Notice of Non-Opposition to Motion to Consolidate Petitions, 
Bifurcation of Issues and Motion to Stay Cause of Action Pending Mediation; 
(j) 04/14/2009 Motion to Appear Telephonically; 
(k) 04/22/2009 - Court Minutes 
(1) 04/23/2009 - Objection to Record; 
(m) 04/2312009 - Objection to Proposed Record of Proceedings as Filed by 
Respondent; 
(n) 05106/2009 Proposed Order re: Motion to Consolidate Petitions for Judicial 
Review; Motion to Bifurcate Issues of Law, and Motion to Stay Cause of Action Pending Mediation; 
(0) 05/1912009 Motion to Compel Settling and Lodging Record with Court; 
(p) 0512112009 - Respondents' Response to Petitioner's Motion for Order to Settle 
and Lodge Agency Record; 
(q) 06/0812009 - Notice of Lodging Agency Record; 
(r) 06/09/2009 - Court Minutes; 
(s) 06/10/2009 Procedural Orders and Order Settling the Record; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
(t) 06112/2009 - Affidavit of Dwight Butlin; 
(u) 06/29/2009 Petitioner Gorringe's Brief; 
(v) 06/29/2009 Petitioner Jasso's Opening Brief; 
(w) 06/2912009 Motion to Augment Record; 
(x) 07/0112009 - Motion to Augment Record Rule 84(1); 
(y) 07/0112009 Affidavit of Dwight Butlin in Support of Respondent's Motion to 
Augment Record; 
(z) 07/07/2009 - Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Augment 
Record; 
(aa) 07/20/2009 - Memorandum in Opposition to Camas County's Motion to 
Augment Record; 
(bb) 07/20/2009 Response; 
(cc) 07/2112009 - Response to Petitioner's Objection to Motion to Augment 
Record; 
(dd) 07/2112009 Affidavit of Dwight Butlin in Support of Respondent's Motion to 
Augment Record; 
(ee) 07/27/2009 Petitioner Jasso's Reply; 
(ft) 0712812009 - Request for Setting of Oral Argument; 
(gg) 07/28/2009 Memorandum in Opposition to Camas County's Response to 
Petitioner's Motion to Augment Record; 
(hh) 07/28/2009 Petitioner Gorringe's Rebuttal Brief; 
(ii) 08/19/2009 Court Minutes; 
(jj) 0812112009 Order Granting Petitioner's Motion to Augment the Record; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
(kk) 1010212009 - Order Upon Hearing for Judicial Review; 
(11) 10/09/2009 - Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees; 
(mm) 10109/2009 - Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees; 
(nn) 10/13/2009 - Memorandum Costs and Attorney Fees; 
(00) 1011312009 Affidavit of Benjamin W. Worst in Support of Memorandum of 
Attorney Fees and Costs; 
(pp) 1012312009 Respondent Camas County's Motion to Disallow Petitioners' 
Costs and Attorney's Fees; 
(qq) 10/23/2009 - Memorandum in Support of Respondent Camas County's Motion 
to Disallow Costs and Attorney's Fees; and 
(IT) 10129/2009 - Request for Hearing on Respondent's Motion to Disallow 
Petitioners' Cost and Attorney Fees. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 31, Appellant requests that all tapes, exhibits, including 
charts, graphs, maps, or other documents, offered and admitted during the proceedings, whether 
hearing or trial, be included as exhibits to the record. 
7. I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Rollie Bennett 
Clerk of the Court 
Fifth Judicial District, Camas County 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield, Idaho 83327 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
Susan Israel 
Court Reporter 
Fifth Judicial District, Camas County 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield, Idaho 83327 
Maureen Newton 
Court Reporter 
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County 
P.O. Box 368 
Rupert, Idaho 83350 
(b) The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the 
clerk's record because Appellant is an officer of the State ofldaho acting in his official capacity, and 
Section 31-3212(2), Idaho Code, provides that county officers shall not charge any fee for any services 
rendered in any action or proceeding in which any state officer in his official capacity is a party. 
(c) The Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because Section 
67-2301, Idaho Code, provides that no filing fee shall be charged for services rendered to any state 
officer in the performance of his official duties. 
(d) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, I.A.R. 
Respectfully submitted this I L--day of November, 2009. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
espl(')fii:lelllW\ppe llant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the L Le.ay of November, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Benjamin W. Worst 
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.e. 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
James W. Phillips 
Roark Law Firm, LLP 
409 North Main Street 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
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Consolidated Case Nos. 
CV-2009-14 & CV-2009-15 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
OF APPEAL 
Appeal from: Fifth Judicial District, Camas County. Honorable Robert Elgee presiding. 
Case number from court: CV 2009-14 and CV 2009-15 
Order or Judgment appealed from: October 2,2009 Order Upon Hearing For Judicial Rc"icw 
Attorney for Appellant: Paul Fitzer 
Attorney for Respondents: James W. Phillips & Benjamin W. Worst 
Appealed by: Respondent 
Appealed against: Petitioners 
Notice of Appeal Filed November 13,2009 
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: 
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: 
Appellate fee paid: None-Exempt 
Respondent's Request for additional clerk's record filed: 
Respondent's Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? Yes 
Name of Reporter: Susan Israel, 201 2nd Ave S, Ste 106, Hailey, ID 83333 
Maureen Ne\\1on. P.O. Box 368, Rupert, ID 83350 
Request for additional reporter's transcript: 
Dated: December 31, 2009 
F.R. BENNETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
By:~~~~~~~~~~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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V. 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO 
a political Subdivision of the 
State of Idaho, 
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SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 
37258-2010 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
L Bobbie D. Walton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Camas, do hereby certify that I 
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record 
and the Court Reporter's Transcript, and any exhibits offered or admitted to each of the 
Attorneys of Record in this case as follows: 
Paul Fitzer 
950 W. Bannock 
Suite 520 
Boise, Id 83702 
James Phillips 
409 N. Main St. 
Hailey, Id 83333 
Benjamin Worst 
P.O. Box 6962 
Ketchum, Id 83340 
IN WITNESS WHEROF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court this M day of March. 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Clerk of the District Court 
B?6~\).~ 
Bobbie D. Walton 
Deputy Clerk 
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State of Idaho, 
Respondent-Appellant 
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SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 
37258-2010 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Bobbie D. Walton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Camas, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. However, the following exhibits will be 
retained at the District Court Clerk' s Office and will be made available upon request: 
1. Agency's Record 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
INWITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
seal of the said Court this ~ day of March, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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Clerk of the District Court 
B-;S~\:)~ 
Bobbie D. Walton 
Deputy Clerk 
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State of Idaho, 
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SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 
37258-2010 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Bobbie D. Walton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Camas, do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under 
my direction as, and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as 
are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I, do further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in the above entitled cause 
will be fully lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's 
Transcript and the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this M day of March, 2010. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
Clerk of the District Court 
~\)~ 
Bobbie D. Walton 
Deputy Clerk 
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